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CONSTITUTIONALIZING
IMMIGRATION LAW ON ITS OWN PATH
Anne R. Traum ∗

ABSTRACT
Courts should insist on heightened procedural protections in immigration adjudication. They should do so under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause rather than by importing Sixth Amendment protections from the criminal context. Traditional judicial oversight and the
Due Process Clause provide a better basis than the Sixth Amendment to
interpose heightened procedural protections in immigration proceedings, especially those involving removal for a serious criminal conviction. The Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence in recent years
lends support for this approach. The Court has guarded the availability
of judicial review of immigration decisions. It has affirmed that courts
are the arbiters of constitutional issues (including due process) and
criminal statutory interpretation. The Court has accorded agency deference on matters of agency expertise, which does not include interpretation of criminal law and convictions. And the Court has created generally applicable procedural protections in order to minimize court
interference with substantive immigration policy. Guided by these core
concepts, courts are poised to develop procedural protections for immigrants in removal proceedings that are tailored to the institutional interests at stake and protective of immigrants. By constitutionalizing
immigration on its own path, courts may also avoid some of the pitfalls
of a Sixth Amendment–based criminal-rights model.
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INTRODUCTION
It is wholly desirable and constitutionally appropriate for courts to
impose procedural protections in immigration proceedings to avoid due
process concerns and facilitate judicial review, but they should not rely
on Sixth Amendment protections to do so. It is well settled that aliens in
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removal proceedings are entitled to due process under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution. Some immigration scholars and advocates have argued that because immigration proceedings are sufficiently
criminal in nature, immigrants, like defendants in criminal cases, should
be afforded Sixth Amendment protections, especially the right to appointed counsel. 1 Those favoring this Sixth Amendment approach may
find a glimmer of hope in the Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 2 in which it held that the defense counsel was deficient for failing
to accurately advise the defendant about the certainty that he would be
deported as a consequence of pleading guilty to a drug trafficking offense. 3 Padilla is a watershed decision because it recognizes that a defendant’s failure to understand immigration consequences of his conviction could render his guilty plea invalid. And Padilla does much to
erase the Court’s rigid and historical classification of deportation as a
civil, not a criminal, proceeding. By likening deportation to criminal
punishment and bringing immigration consequences within the ambit of
the defense counsel’s duty to the client, Padilla arguably lends support
to the view that Sixth Amendment protections should be afforded to
persons in removal proceedings.
Despite the allure of the Sixth Amendment—especially because it
offers the promise of a right to appointed counsel—courts should instead tailor procedural protections to fit immigration law based on traditional judicial powers and due process concerns. In confirming and developing procedural protections in immigration law, the Sixth
Amendment doctrine might serve as an important guidepost, but it may
neither fit immigration proceedings nor sufficiently protect immigrants.
Instead, courts should rely, as they have done historically, on the Due
Process Clause and their traditional judicial review functions to ensure
that immigration proceedings are fair, just, and sufficiently transparent
to allow review.
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence has amplified several themes that are essential to this approach.
The Court has guarded the availability of judicial review of immigration
decisions. It has affirmed that courts are the arbiters of constitutional
issues (including due process) and criminal statutory interpretation. The
Court has accorded deference on matters of agency expertise, while
identifying areas not within the agency’s expertise as within its own
bailiwick. And it has created generally applicable procedural protections
1 Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011) (proposing a right to deportation counsel based on the Sixth and Fifth Amendments).
2 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
3 Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011) (describing Padilla’s contribution to a “reconceptualization” of the nature of deportation and arguing in
favor of right to counsel).
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in order to minimize court interference with substantive immigration
policy and law. Aided by these core concepts, courts are poised to develop procedural protections for immigrants in removal proceedings
that are tailored to the institutional interests at stake and protective of
immigrants, who in many cases are facing permanent exile and the risk
of harm upon return to their native land. Importantly, by constitutionalizing immigration on its own path, courts may also avoid some of the
pitfalls of adopting a Sixth Amendment–based criminal-rights model.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes some of the criminal aspects of removal proceedings, focusing on the adjudication of
“aggravated felony” convictions under immigration law. Part II identifies several core features of a due process–based judicial review framework that would support judicially imposed procedural protections for
noncitizens in removal proceedings. Part III examines two important
procedural protections in criminal law, namely, constitutional discovery
and the right to counsel, and proposes how analogous protections might
be interposed in immigration courts using the due process–based judicial review framework.
I. CRIMINAL LAW IN IMMIGRATION COURT
Developments over the past several decades have changed the focus of immigration law and the role of courts in reviewing immigration
decisions. Immigration laws expanded the immigration consequences of
criminal convictions and restricted judicial review of immigration decisions. As a result, immigration courts are deeply involved in determining the immigration consequences of criminal convictions. At the same
time, judicial review of immigration decisions has been limited or eliminated altogether. Coupled with stepped-up enforcement, greater numbers of immigrants are in removal proceedings than ever before,4 facing
harsher conditions during removal proceedings and harsher consequences as a result of the proceedings, with limited ability to seek judicial review of the agency action.
This Article focuses on removal proceedings for immigrants based
on “aggravated felony” convictions, one of the centerpieces of immigra4 In 1996, when Congress expanded the term “aggravated felony,” approximately 50,000
noncitizens were removed, nearly 33,000 of them based on criminal conviction. IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 173 (1997), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/
statyearbk96.zip. By contrast, in 2010, approximately 363,000 noncitizens were detained and
387,000 noncitizens were removed, approximately 169,000 of them based on a criminal conviction. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010 1 [hereinafter IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010],
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf.
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tion enforcement. Though many grounds for deportation exist, removal
based on prior criminal conviction is common and deportation based on
an “aggravated felony” leads to automatic removal and permanent exile. 5 Because the aggravated felony determination focuses on a criminal
conviction and the stakes are so high, these removal proceedings may
be the most comparable to criminal proceedings. This discussion considers several aspects of these immigration proceedings, including the
relationship to the underlying criminal conviction, the removal hearing
environment, and the legal analysis immigration courts perform in determining aggravated felonies. While immigration courts are steeped in
criminal law issues in a criminal-like setting, their function and mission
is distinct from criminal court proceedings: they have no institutional
expertise in criminal law, do not make factual findings, and do not adjudicate guilt or sentencing enhancements.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, criminal
proceedings and immigration proceedings are integrally related. 6 Critics
have observed more broadly that the criminalization of immigration law
has been asymmetric 7: the government has increasingly relied on criminal statutes, criminal law enforcement tactics, and criminal and deportation penalties as immigration policy tools, but immigrants have not been
accorded corresponding criminal procedural rights. Doctrinally, immigration proceedings have historically been labeled by the Court as civil,
not criminal. 8 This classification is important because immigrants in
removal proceedings do not have a right to appointed counsel or other
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants under the Sixth
Amendment. 9 In practice, however, this distinction has become blurred
as immigration has transformed criminal practice and criminal law issues saturate immigration proceedings. In exploring the theoretical support for affording similar procedural rights in immigration court, it is
helpful to examine the practical importance of procedural rights in the
underlying criminal and subsequent removal proceedings.

5
6
7

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
Id. at 1482.
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
135 n.1 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Markowitz, supra note
3, at 1339–47.
8 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1334; Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 298–307 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s treatment of immigration as a civil, rather than criminal, matter).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (referring to “all criminal prosecutions”); Kanstroom, supra note
1, at 1501 (citing Charles Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 875, 875–76 (1961)) (explaining that the civil law label has precluded application of the
Sixth Amendment to immigration proceedings).
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Immigration Consequences of Aggravated Felonies

For nearly a century, immigration law has imposed the severe
sanction of deportation for immigrants convicted of crimes on American
soil. 10 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 authorized deportation for commission of a felony “crime involving moral turpitude” within five years of entry or two or more crimes involving moral turpitude
any time after entry. 11 As early as 1922, narcotics offenses were added
as grounds for removal and treated as crimes involving moral turpitude. 12 The term “aggravated felony” was incorporated into the immigration law in 1988 and is unique to the immigration code, as it is not
used elsewhere in federal statutes. 13 Initially, the term only included a
handful of serious crimes, including murder and trafficking in drugs or
guns. 14 In 1990, Congress barred discretionary relief to any person convicted of an aggravated felony who had served at least five years in
prison. 15
The definition of “aggravated felony” was greatly expanded in
1996 with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 16 These laws added many criminal convictions to the list of “aggravated felonies,” even including cases in
which the court imposed a suspended sentence, requiring no service of
jail or prison time. 17 By expanding the list of deportable offenses, Con10
11
12
13
14

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–79 (citing S. REP. NO. 1515, at 54–55 (1950)).
Id. at 1479.
Id.
See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010).
See Anti–Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4182,
4469–70 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101a), 1252(a)).
15 See INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001) (citing Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat.
4978, 5052 (1990) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c))).
16 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
tit. IV, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C,
§ 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)). AEDPA became effective on
April 24, 1996, 110 Stat. at 1214, and IIRIRA became effective on September 30, 1996, 110 Stat.
at 3009-546.
17 Under present law, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011):
The term “aggravated felony” means—
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title
21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18);
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921
of Title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title);
(D) [money laundering, as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957], if the amount of
the funds exceeded $10,000;
(E) [firearms and explosives offenses, described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 842(h–i); 844(d–
i); 922(g)(1–5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r); or 924(b), (h); 26 U.S.C. § 5861];
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gress created a much larger class of persons subject to removal based on
criminal convictions. 18 That same year, Congress also barred discretionary relief for any person convicted of an aggravated felony, even if
they received a suspended prison sentence. 19 Today removal of “crimi(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment at least one year;
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for
which the term of imprisonment at least one year;
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of Title 18 (relating to
the demand for or receipt of ransom);
(I) [a child pornography offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2251A, or
2252];
(J) [a racketeer-influenced-corrupt-organizations offense described in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962, 1084 or 1955], for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more
may be imposed;
(K) [a prostitution or involuntary servitude offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§
2421, 2422, or 2423 or 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1585 or 1588–1591];
(L) a [spying offense described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 798, 2153, 2381 or 2382; or
50 U.S.C. § 421];
(M) an offense that—
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which
the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000;
(N) [an alien-smuggling offense described in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or (a)(2)],
except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown
that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent . . . to violate a provision of this chapter;
(O) an [unlawful reentry] offense described in [8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) or 1326];
(P) [a passport] offense in violation of [18 U.S.C. §§ 1543 or1546(a)] for which
the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien [committed the
offense intending to benefit the alien’s spouse, child, or parent];
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5
years or more;
(R) [a vehicle theft or fraud offense] for which the term of imprisonment is at
least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury,
or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years'
imprisonment or more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.
The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign
country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15
years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the
term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 (citing 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c))).
19 IIRIRA repealed the broad discretionary relief previously available under § 212(c). See
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-597. The new law replaced discretionary relief with a provision that
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nal aliens” is a central part of immigration enforcement and includes a
large class of aggravated felons. 20
A determination in immigration court that an alien’s prior conviction is an “aggravated felony” 21 carries serious and lasting consequences. An aggravated felon faces certain removal and is ineligible for
release pending removal 22 and discretionary relief from removal, such
as “voluntary departure” or political asylum. 23 An aggravated felon
cannot lawfully return to the United States 24 and will face criminal
sanctions if found to have returned to this country, including significant
sentencing enhancements based on the prior “aggravated felony” conviction. 25 Whether a prior conviction is an aggravated felony is a purely
legal issue that can involve complex statutory analysis of criminal laws
and criminal records. 26 The aggravated felony determination is made in
the first instance by the immigration court and appealable to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the federal circuit court where the
removal action was filed. 27 Although courts generally lack jurisdiction
to review an order of removal based on an aggravated felony conviction, the propriety of the aggravated felony determination is a judicially
authorizes the Attorney General to cancel removal for a narrow class of inadmissible or deportable aliens, but excludes any person “convicted of any aggravated felony.” See id. at 3009-594
(adding section 240A to the Immigration and Nationality Act, tit. II, ch. 4) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2006)); id. § 1229b(a)(3). In Judulang v. Holder, appeal docketed, No. 10-694 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 2010), the Supreme Court will address whether a lawful permanent resident who previously pled guilty to offenses that rendered him excludable and deportable, but who did not
leave the country before the start of removal proceedings against him, may be granted discretionary relief from deportation under former § 212(c). See Kevin Johnson, Argument Recap: Former
Section 212(c) Relief from Removal for Lawful Permanent Residents Convicted of Aggravated
Felonies, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/
argument-recap-judulang-v-holder-former-section-212c-relief-from-removal-for-lawfulpermanent-residents-convicted-of-aggravated-felonies.
20 See IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 4, at 1(noting that of the
approximately 387,000 persons deported in 2010, 169,000 were “known criminal aliens”).
21 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011).
22 See id. § 1226(c) (requiring mandatory custody pending removal) and Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (discussing provisions requiring mandatory custody of aggravated felons
and eliminating judicial review of custody decisions).
23 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b)(a)(3) (prohibiting cancellation of removal for persons convicted
of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229(c)(a)(i) (aggravated felon ineligible for voluntary departure);
id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (aggravated felon ineligible for asylum).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II) (2006) (aggravated felons are “inadmissible”).
25 See id. § 1326 (criminalizing unlawful reentry by removed aliens); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (adding multiple-level sentencing enhancement for person committed of “aggravated felony,” as defined in the INA). If convicted, the noncitizen, aggravated
felon first serves a criminal sentence before being deported again.
26 See, e.g., Nijawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (surveying state “fraud and deceit”
statutes in effect in 1996, when Congress defined aggravated felony to include an offense that
“involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” to help
discern Congress’s intent in setting the threshold); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 nn.5–6
(2004) (referring to thirty-six state statutes criminalizing injury caused by driver under the influence).
27 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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reviewable legal issue. 28 As discussed below, the aggravated felony
determination may involve a detailed and technical analysis of a the
prior conviction, the relevant state or federal statute of conviction, related case law, and the record of conviction from the state or federal
court that adjudicated the conviction.
B.

Padilla and the Criminal Process Before
Removal Proceedings

Though the aggravated felony determination is made in immigration court, the underlying conviction for it is established in criminal
court. In the litigation continuum, a noncitizen moves from conviction
in state or federal criminal court where he has the assistance of counsel
and other criminal procedure rights, to removal proceedings in immigration court where he has no right to counsel and many fewer procedural
protections. The Supreme Court held in Padilla that counsel in criminal
cases have a duty to inform the defendant about whether his plea carries
a risk of deportation. 29 It is especially valuable for the noncitizen to get
such advice in the criminal court record before or while the record is
being made because that record of conviction forms the basis for the
aggravated felony analysis in immigration court. 30 As Padilla highlights, immigration law consequences can significantly impact the resolution of the criminal case.
As the Court in Padilla recognized, immigration consequences are
an “integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part” of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants for a criminal
conviction. 31 The severe immigration consequences imposed on noncitizens with prior convictions “have dramatically raised the stakes of
noncitizen’s criminal conviction.” 32 The Court explained that immigration consequences may be important to both sides in resolving a criminal case: because the “threat of deportation is a powerful incentive to
plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal that does,” both defense and prosecution may

28 See id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (providing that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” an aggravated felony or crime of moral turpitude); id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (preserving judicial review of
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section).
29 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). The Court remanded on the issue of
prejudice. Id. at 1487.
30 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (describing documents used to prove prior convictions).
31 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
32 Id.
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benefit by “[b]ringing deportation consequences into this process.” 33 As
a practical matter, state and federal prosecutors, and by extension defense lawyers, play an important role in determining which noncitizens
will be deported permanently or with the possibility of administrative
relief. 34
In Padilla, a noncitizen who had been a lawful permanent resident
of this country for over forty years pleaded guilty in state court to a felony drug charge that “made his deportation virtually mandatory.” 35 His
lawyer had assured him that having lived here so long, he did not have
to worry about immigration consequences—which was obviously
wrong because the drug transportation conviction would clearly make
him deportable. 36 Claiming his lawyer in the criminal proceeding was
ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Padilla
alleged that but for his attorney’s incorrect advice, he would have insisted on going to trial. 37 Analyzing the claim under the two-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, 38 the Court found that the defense
counsel’s performance was deficient based on the incorrect advice on
the risk of deportation, and it remanded on the issue of whether the attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced Padilla. 39
Padilla highlights the indeterminacy of the civil–criminal distinction and its significance for the procedural rights afforded to noncitizens. In Padilla the civil–criminal distinction was considered in the
narrow context of whether deportation was “collateral” to the criminal
case or part of the criminal penalty that the defendant was required to
understand before pleading guilty. 40 While Padilla specifically brings
immigration consequences into the ambit of defense counsel’s duties in
33
34
35
36

Id.
See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1350 (2010).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (West 2011); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (referring to a guilty
plea for “transportation of a large amount of marijuana”).
37 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
38 Id. at 1482 (analyzing claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984),
which provides for relief if counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different”).
39 Id. at 1486.
40 Id. at 1480; see also United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[Defendant] testified that, as an employee of his family’s gun dealership, he would not have pleaded
guilty to the offense had he known that the conviction would affect his ability to possess firearms.”); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1963) (“[T]he conviction has
been a source of embarrassment and loss of prestige to petitioner as a responsible citizen and
union leader, and that if petitioner had fully realized the consequences of the plea, he would not
have entered it.”); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18 n.6,
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223, at *18 n.6 (listing
other severe “collateral consequences” of conviction, such as sex offender registration, civil
commitment, professional disbarment) (citing Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004))
(“[D]efendant was unaware of committal for life as sexually dangerous person”).
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a criminal case, the Court stopped short of labeling deportation as criminal or civil, finding that the “collateral versus direct distinction” is “illsuited” to evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 41 In
Padilla the Court was focused on the assistance of counsel in the criminal proceeding, not the related immigration proceeding when the immigration consequences were actually imposed. The Court observed that
deportation is a “particularly severe ‘penalty’” 42 that is integral to the
penalty aspects of a criminal case. At the same time, it stated that deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,” 43 and removal proceedings in immigration court are civil in nature. 44 Still, the Court acknowledged the interrelationship of these two proceedings: “Our law
has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for
nearly a century.” 45 Because recent immigration law changes have made
deportation “nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen
offenders,” the Court added, it is “most difficult to divorce the penalty
from the conviction in the deportation context.” 46
While immigration law has become more criminal in nature, Padilla and other examples remind us that this is not a one-way street. 47 In
criminal cases against a noncitizen, “civil” immigration law consequences may drive the resolution of the case. “Bringing deportation
consequences into this [criminal] process,” 48 the Court explained, can
be mutually beneficial to the defense and the prosecution, as the threat
of immigration consequences is powerful incentive to plead guilty. Effective defense counsel would seek to negotiate a guilty plea that avoids
or eliminates the risk of deportation. 49 While in Padilla the risk of deportation could be readily ascertained from the relevant immigration
statute, the Court acknowledged that many criminal lawyers are not
versed in immigration law, which “can be complex, and is a legal specialty of its own.” 50
As a practical matter, one must ask which criminal procedural protections benefit a noncitizen defendant in a criminal case. In theory,
noncitizens in criminal court are afforded the same rights as other criminal defendants under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amend-

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
Id. at 1481 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1481 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 1482.
Eagly, supra note 34, at 1298 (highlighting that while immigration scholars have challenged “the continuing classification of deportation as civil,” they have not explored “the opposite
question of whether criminal law may serve an immigration screening function”).
48 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1483.
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ments. 51 In practice, those rights may seem less robust to noncitizens in
criminal cases for two main reasons. First, as Padilla reinforces, ninetyfive percent of all defendants are convicted by means of a guilty plea.52
Defendants who plead guilty waive many constitutional rights, including, typically, any challenge to guilt or pre-guilt issues, 53 the right to
jury trial and trial-based protections, 54 proof of the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, 55 and, often, the right to appeal. 56 Padilla highlights
that noncitizens face extreme pressure to plead guilty to avoid or minimize immigration consequences. Data on federal guilty pleas shows
that noncitizen defendants plead guilty at higher rates than in other
substantive areas. 57 Aside from the right to appointed counsel, most
noncitizen defendants may actually exercise few criminal rights in criminal court. Second, noncitizens may not experience criminal procedure
in the same way as citizens. 58
Noncitizens, especially those charged with immigration crimes,
may be treated differently in criminal court. 59 As Professor Eagly describes with respect to federal immigration prosecutions, many noncitizens cannot obtain bail because they are already in immigration custody
or would be if ordered released by the federal court. 60 Prosecutors may
have access to incriminating evidence obtained by immigration law
enforcement under less protective standards, such as by interrogating a
noncitizen without Miranda warnings, 61 making warrantless border
51 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1295 (discussing the conventional view that noncitizen defendants
in criminal courts are afforded a full panoply of criminal procedure rights and prosecutors enjoy
institutional autonomy).
52 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.13; see also Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter
(Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2011) (“[Padilla] may signal . . . the Court’s recognition
of plea bargaining’s dominant role in criminal adjudication.”).
53 United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1965).
54 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (“A plea of guilty . . . is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.”).
55 Id.
56 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically contemplates that defendants may
waive “the right to appeal,” and most do. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N); see also Nancy J. King &
Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212
(2005) (finding that defendants waive appeal in nearly two-thirds of plea agreements nationwide).
57 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1323 fig.1, 1324 n.259 (discussing factors affecting guilty plea
rates).
58 See id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment:
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423–32 (2011) (describing ways in which noncitizens are disadvantaged in criminal proceedings).
59 Chin, supra note 58, at 1423–32.
60 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1307 (describing an “immigration detainer,” which requires the
district court to release a defendant to immigration custody); see also Chin, supra note 58, at
1423–32 (describing denial of bail under state laws).
61 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1308 (describing how un-Mirandized statements obtained in “administrative” or “noncustodial” settings later may be admitted against a criminal defendant). A
witness’s undocumented status may be used to impeach him, thus impeding a defendant’s right to
testify on his own behalf or the risk of summoning witnesses on his behalf. Chin, supra note 58,
at 1427–28. Undocumented persons may be ineligible for nonprison sentences. Id. at 1430–31.
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searches, or obtaining “administrative warrants” based on reasonable
suspicion. 62 Some jurisdictions expedite high-volume processing of
immigration crimes under “Operation Streamline,” in which every illegal re-entrant in a particular border sector is prosecuted, and the “Fast
Track” program, in which noncitizens may plead guilty quickly in exchange for a discounted sentence. 63
The prosecution of noncitizens arrested in a 2008 immigration raid
at a meat processing plant in Postville, Iowa offers an extreme example
of how noncitizens may experience a form of criminal prosecution that
is more administrative than criminal in nature. 64 In that case, hundreds
of noncitizen factory workers were arrested, appointed counsel in
groups of ten or more, and within four days of arrest, they pleaded
guilty and were sentenced on the same day. 65 Most of them pleaded
guilty to using false documents, which was unusual in that such undocumented persons often are promptly deported, not charged criminally. 66 The guilty plea agreements also contained a “stipulated removal
order” in which they abandoned in criminal court any relief from removal that they might have obtained in immigration court. 67 Such en
masse processing is reminiscent of removal proceedings against immigrant detainees rather than the individualized attention usually accorded
criminal defendants in adjudicating guilt and imposing sentence. 68
Padilla underscores that as a practical matter criminal practice has
been transformed by immigration law and vice versa. Federally, immigration cases comprise over one-third of the total docket. 69 Scholars
have observed how immigration and criminal law enforcement activities
at the state and federal levels have blurred the line between these two
areas. 70 The reality for noncitizen defendants is that immigration law
62 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1312–17 (referring to warrantless and administrative searches at
the border or its “functional equivalent,” such as airport).
63 See Chacón, supra note 7, at 142 (describing Operations Streamline and Fast Track);
Eagly, supra note 34, at 1321–24 (stating that in 2008 the median number of days for immigration case processing was less than 10 days, compared to 250 days for other crime categories).
64 Chacón, supra note 7, at 143; Eagly, supra note 34, at 1301–03.
65 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1301–03.
66 Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008
at A1 (reporting that 260 of the immigrants were sentenced to five months for using false documents).
67 Eagly, supra note 34, at 1304.
68 Brandon Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 394–99 (2007)
(highlighting the rhetorical emphasis on a criminal defendant’s individualized rights and day in
court).
69 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS:
MARCH 31, 2010, at 12, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseload
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx (reporting that immigration filings made up
35% of all criminal filings, an 11% increase over the prior year in terms of number of cases, and a
10% increase over prior year in terms of number of defendants).
70 See Chacón, supra note 7, at 135 n.1 (citing Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders:
Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1827–
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may shape the terms of a guilty plea, the court’s processing of the case,
and the sentence.71 This overlay of immigration law in the criminal
process may render it a quasi-administrative process, especially for this
class of defendants.
C.

Criminal Aspects of Removal Proceedings

Removal proceedings, which are traditionally civil and administrative in nature, have many quasi-criminal features. This is in part a reflection of the substantive criminal law focus in removal proceedings, as
immigration courts adjudicate prior criminal convictions. But it also
stems from the widespread use of detention of noncitizens, which affects the circumstances of adjudication in important ways. Detention
and lack of counsel greatly diminish a noncitizen’s chances of success
in removal proceedings. 72 Detention is a hardship on the individual and
the family that may make it difficult to access legal services, get advice
from family or community, or gather evidence to support a defense to
removal charges or claim for discretionary relief. These circumstances
may result in some noncitizens being unable to support a defense or
foregoing defenses altogether in order to expedite deportation. 73
The rise in the number of persons in immigration detention has
been dramatic. 74 In 1994, approximately 6000 noncitizens were in detention on any given day. 75 By 2001, the daily detention rate had tripled
to more than 20,000 individuals and by 2008 it had spiked to 33,000.76
The annual detention rate over this same period jumped from approx32 (2007) (outlining “origins and consequences of the blurred boundaries between immigration
control, crime control, and national security”)); Legomsky, supra note 7, at 471–72 (describing
“growing convergence” of criminal justice and immigration control systems); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–77
(2006).
71 See Chin, supra note 58, at 1430–31 (noting that undocumented persons may be ineligible
for nonprison sentences under state law); Eagly, supra note 34, at 1318–19 (observing that noncitizens are more likely to receive a prison sentence and serve more time at higher security prisons
based on their classification as a “deportable alien”).
72 See Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, New York Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel
in Removal Proceedings (pt. 1), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2011) [hereinafter NYIRS
Report] (finding that in removal proceedings noncitizens with counsel were five times more
likely than unrepresented noncitizens to obtain relief and that seventy-nine percent of detained
noncitizens were unrepresented).
73 Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 46
(2010).
74 Id. at 44–45.
75 Id.; DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRANT
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 6 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf.
76 Kalhan, supra note 73, at 44–45.
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imately 81,000 to 380,000 individuals. 77 Today, almost half of all removal proceedings involve detainees, up from one-third of proceedings
as recently as 2004. 78
This increase in detention stems from overall growth in immigration removal proceedings generally as well as statutory changes. Noncitizens in detention comprise three main groups: persons deemed “inadmissible” upon their arrival or return to the United States, persons in
removal proceedings, and persons awaiting deportation after a final
removal order. 79 By statute, noncitizens facing removal based on a
criminal conviction, including those alleged to have an aggravated felony conviction must be taken into immigration custody upon release
from criminal custody. 80 Aggravated felons are ineligible for bail pending removal. 81 In 2010, approximately half of the 392,000 noncitizens
removed from this country were convicted criminals, with drug crimes,
immigration crimes, and criminal trafficking crimes leading the list of
convictions. 82
The circumstances of immigration detention exacerbate the general
hardship. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contracts
with local jails and prisons for detention space, so although these noncitizens are in “civil” detention, they often reside in a criminal jail setting
and, even if separated, are treated like prisoners. 83 Reported lack of
medical care, inadequate conditions, separation of children from par77
78

Id.
Id.; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at O1 fig.23 (2009), available at http:// www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy08syb.pdf.
79 Kalhan, supra note 73, at 45.
80 Id. at 45 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006)); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of
the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1936, 1938–43 (2000) (discussing expansion of grounds for deportability).
81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
82 See FY2010 Sees Record Alien Removal from U.S., HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE,
Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/fy2010-sees-record-alien-removal-us.
In June 2011, ICE reported having removed 387,000 noncitizens, 169,000 of whom were convicted criminals. These reports do not specify whether the aliens were deemed aggravated felons,
but the list of crimes suggest many were. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra
note 4, at 3–4. The Department of Homeland Security reported in 2011 that it had initiated
223,217 removal actions against criminal aliens in 2010 and had removed 169,000 convicted
criminals. Id. The lag in actual removals compared to the number of charges suggests that a
significant number of noncitizens succeed in getting the charge dismissed or obtaining discretionary relief from removal (if the criminal conviction is not an aggravated felony).
83 Rachel L. Swarns, 2 Groups Compare Immigrant Detention Centers to Prisons, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A17 (describing children as young as six years old separated from their
parents); A Growing Detention Network, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2008/12/26/us/1227_DETAIN.html (interactive map of local, private and federal
detention centers used to house immigration detainees); see also About the U.S. Detention and
Deportation System, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/
aboutdetention (noting that DHS owns and operates its own detention centers and contracts for
bed space from over 312 county and city prisons nationwide).
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ents, 84 limited access to visitors, 85 and deaths in custody all contribute
to concerns about detention. 86 Transfer of detainees far from their
homes to remote detention facilities is routine and, some argue, raises
due process concerns. 87 Such transfers disrupt access to families, legal
services, evidence, and witnesses, and tend to extend the length of detention and delay immigration proceedings. 88
The removal proceeding itself is affected by these conditions.
These proceedings often take place in a detention facility, with the same
immigration judge and government attorneys in case after case.89
Burgeoning caseloads and a steady backlog strain immigration judges,
who complain that they simply do not have time to think. Because most
noncitizens do not have counsel and may lack access to any legal services, the burden falls on the immigration judge to develop the record,
make sure the noncitizen understands their legal rights, and adjudicate a
range of complex legal issues. 90 These tasks are made more difficult by
the lack of judges, staff, equipment, and translators. Some immigration
judges spend all of their time in prisons, adjudicating removal proceedings of convicted criminals in state custody before they are ever physically transferred to immigration detention. 91 The agency appeals
process is high-volume and handled by few judges. Federal circuit
courts of appeals, which review petitions challenging removal orders,
reverse immigration court decisions at higher rates than other kinds of
appeals. 92
84
85

Swarns, supra note 83.
Nina Bernstein, Volunteers Report on Treatment of Immigrant Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2010, at A26.
86 Scott M. Stringer & Andrew Friedman, Unfair to Immigrants, Costly for Taxpayers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at A23 (describing poor conditions, lack of medical care, and a reported 107
deaths detained aliens from 2004 to 2010).
87 See Markowitz, supra note 8, at 348–50.
88 Kirk Semple, Transfers Delay Release of Detainees, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2011, at A20.
89 DHS operates detention facilities with full-time immigration courts on site. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Oct. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm.
90 Julia Preston, Immigration Judges Found Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A11
(“[J]udges spoke of an overwhelming volume of cases with insufficient time for careful review, a
shortage of law clerks and language interpreters, and failing computers and equipment for recording hearings.”).
91 In New York, for example, Immigration Judge Roger Sagerman is assigned full time to
adjudicate immigration removal actions in the Downstate and Ulster Correctional Facilities. See
EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 89.
92 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting a year-end forty percent
reversal rate in appeals of Board of Immigration decisions, compared to an eighteen percent
reversal rates in appeals in which the United States is appellee). Judge Posner stated that this high
reversal rate was “due to the fact that the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level
has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.” Id. at 830. A recent article cites an
opinion authored by Judge Posner overturning an agency decision denying asylum. James Warren, Not Mincing Words Over Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at A21; see also Lynne Ma-

TRAUM.33.2

2011]

12/19/2011 10:55 PM

C O N S T I T U T I O N A LI ZI N G I M M I G R A TI O N
D.

507

Aggravated Felony Determinations: Analyzing
Criminal Law Immigration Courts

The focus on criminal convictions requires immigration courts to
assess immigration consequences of criminal convictions. To do that,
immigration courts must analyze whether a state or federal conviction
qualifies as a deportable offense. 93 Though the starting and end point of
this analysis is an immigration law issue, this often requires a technical
analysis of criminal law and the record of the conviction. 94 The definition of “aggravated felony” includes a long list of offenses, many of
which refer to federal criminal statutes, and includes any federal- or
state-law offense that meets the definition. 95 Since only six percent of
convictions occur in federal court, 96 this analysis usually involves determining whether a state court conviction under a state statute as interpreted under state law, 97 qualifies under the federal definition of aggravated felony. 98 Unlike federal and state courts that actually handle
criminal cases on a daily basis, the immigration court is not a criminal
court, does not adjudicate guilt, and institutionally is not steeped in
criminal procedure. Though administrative courts are empowered to
rek, Posner Blasts Immigration Courts as ‘Inadequate’ and Ill-Trained, NAT’L L.J. ONLINE, Apr.
22, 2008 (“This is a system of adjudication that is clearly inadequate.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
93 The inquiry may require detailed comparison of state criminal statutes to determine the
contours of the federal definition and how to apply it, see Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 nn.5–
6 (2004) (surveying state statutes criminalizing injury caused by driver under the influence), or
touch on complex issues of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d
684 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing treatment of expunged state conviction for minor drug offense).
94 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587 n.12 (2010) (limiting inquiry to the
state court record of conviction).
95 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011) (including in the definition any state, federal, or
foreign conviction “for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15
years”).
96 MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (“94% of felony convictions occurred in State courts, the remaining 6% in
Federal courts.”).
97 Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2010) (stating that in determining whether
a defendant’s Florida conviction was “violent felony” under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the
Court is “bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law,” including the elements of the statute under which the defendant was convicted).
98 See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2587 n.12 (“Linking our inquiry to the record of
conviction comports with how we have categorized convictions for state offenses within the
definition of generic federal criminal sanctions under the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . .”
(citation omitted)). Analysis of aggravated felony convictions and prior convictions under the
ACCA requires careful analysis of each state’s law as interpreted by that state’s highest court.
See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) (observing that categorical analysis
of prior convictions under the ACCA “is not always easy to apply”); Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (surveying state law statutes to derive generic definition of “burglary” under
the ACCA).
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perform such analysis for ancillary matters not within their subject expertise, aggravated felony determinations present a hybrid situation in
which an immigration law expressly refers to definitions not within the
agency’s expertise. 99
For example, the aggravated felony definition for “crime of violence” requires courts to analyze prior convictions under state and federal criminal law to determine whether prior conviction qualifies as an
aggravated felony. The term “aggravated felony” includes “a crime of
violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a purely
political offense) for which the term of imprisonment is at least one
year.” 100 The definition of aggravated felony would include any state or
federal offense that meets this description 101 with two exceptions: it
only includes felonies and does not include “purely political” offenses. 102 So the first step is to determine whether the conviction is a
“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a nonimmigration statute that
is part of the criminal code, and the second step would be to determine
whether any immigration statute exceptions apply.
To determine if a prior conviction is an “aggravated felony,” immigration courts usually follow the same analysis as criminal courts
when analyzing prior convictions. 103 Federal criminal courts have analyzed prior convictions in a variety of settings, primarily to determine
whether statutory recidivist or other sentencing enhancements apply.
One such statute is the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which
enhances the sentence imposed upon certain firearm-law offenders who
also have three prior “violent felony” convictions. 104 In analyzing
whether a prior state conviction meets the definition of “violent felony,”
courts apply a “categorical method” by examining the elements of the

99 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (“The weight we accord the agency’s
explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency,
and persuasiveness.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986)
(recognizing agency jurisdiction to adjudicate claim under statutory procedure because that claim
and related counterclaim were “necessary” to agency’s exercise of jurisdiction).
100 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
101 The law defines “crime of violence” as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
102 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (excluding “a purely political offense” from the definition).
103 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
104 The ACCA defines “violent felony” to include: first, felonies with elements that involve
the use of physical force against another; second, felonies that amount to “burglary, arson, or
extortion” or that involve the use of explosives; and third, felonies that “otherwise involv[e]
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (West 2011).
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federal or state statute of conviction and the nature of the offense,105
without regard to the particular facts of the crime. 106 A prior conviction
qualifies if the statute of conviction meets the “violent felony” definition and is no broader.107 If the statute of conviction is broader than the
“violent felony” definition, the court advances to a second step in which
it may consider a narrow range of documents from the record of conviction to assess whether the defendant’s conviction necessarily establishes
that he was convicted of conduct that meets the “violent felony” definition. 108
In analyzing prior convictions, criminal courts do not engage in
formal fact finding. Some debate this point because the factual analysis
of the record conviction can be technical and factually detailed, and its
consequences in the later proceeding can be enormous. 109 But the distinction is legally significant because criminal defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial on any fact other than a prior conviction
that is sufficient to raise the statutory maximum penalty. 110 The Supreme Court has thus been careful to limit the prior conviction analysis
to avoid new fact-finding and has restricted the inquiry to historical
facts contained in judicial documents from the record of conviction. 111
105 See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–30 (2009) (analyzing state failureto-report conviction to determine whether it is a “violent felony” under § 924(e)); James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192, 203–07 (2007) (analyzing state attempted burglary conviction to determine
whether it is a “burglary” under § 924(e)); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–25 (2005)
(analyzing state burglary conviction by guilty plea to determine if it is a “burglary” under
§ 924(e)); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990) (analyzing state burglary conviction by jury verdict to determine if it qualifies as a “burglary” for sentencing enhancement
under the ACCA).
106 See Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (discussing categorical analysis applied in
analyzing prior convictions under the ACCA).
107 The ACCA definition of “violent felony” is similar to the definition of “crime of violence”
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and incorporated in the aggravated felony definition in 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).
108 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
109 Justice Thomas has criticized as unconstitutional the prior-conviction exception to the
Court’s general rule, articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits judicial determination of facts that increase the statutory maximum sentence. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26–27 (Thomas, J., concurring). The prior-conviction exception
allows for judicial determination of a prior conviction, even though the inquiry often requires
factual analysis, if not findings of fact. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
239–44 (1998). The Court in Shepard acknowledged the risk that prior-conviction analysis, if too
factually involved, could run afoul of the Sixth Amendment:
While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too
far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much
like the findings [requiring right to jury findings under] Jones and Apprendi, to say that
Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25.
110 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
111 For jury-verdict convictions, courts analyze the jury verdict, jury instructions, and charging
documents. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02. For guilty-plea convictions, the court analyzes the plea
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The Court has prohibited consideration of other documents, like a police
report, which it said “is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings” that
would trigger a jury-trial right. 112 As a practical matter, courts seek to
avoid relitigation of valid convictions and do not entertain challenges to
the validity of a prior conviction in a later case. 113 While the priorconviction analysis may be extremely technical, it has consistently been
treated as a legal inquiry that does not require factfinding.
Immigration courts generally perform the same two-step legal
analysis in analyzing criminal convictions for immigration purposes.
The immigration court does not engage in factfinding so long as it is
analyzing a general offense, like “theft” or “crime of violence.”114 The
court’s analysis focuses on documents and transcripts from the record of
conviction, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.115
At this stage, however, the noncitizen facing deportation for an aggravated felony conviction no longer has a right to appointed counsel, is
detained, and his access to documents from his record of conviction
may be limited to those presented by the government attorney. As a
practical matter, it may be very difficult for an unrepresented noncitizen
to challenge the prior conviction because the analysis is so technical and
may turn on subtleties of law and documentary inferences that are not
obvious to the uninitiated. 116

agreement and plea colloquy to determine the factual basis for the plea. Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at
2299 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26).
112 Id.
113 Defendants cannot challenge the validity of a prior conviction in federal sentencing unless
the defendant was self-represented. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 506 (1994).
114 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2586 n.11 (noting that this approach
applies to “generic” offenses but not “circumstance-specific” offenses, like “fraud or deceit in
which the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000,” like in Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2301). In
Nijhawan, the immigration court was permitted to determine whether the fraud exceeded
$10,000, even though that loss amount was not an element of the statute of conviction. Nijhawan,
129 S. Ct. at 2303.
115 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2006) (providing that the government must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the alien is removable, for example, based on the prior aggravated
felony, and can rely on a range of documents from the record of conviction, including court
transcripts, records, and judgments of conviction).
116 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (“Immigration law can be complex,
and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in it.”); Singh v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 980 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The maze of immigration statutes and amendments is
notoriously complicated and has been described as ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in
complexity.”’ (quoting Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir.1988))).
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Improving Fairness in Immigration Court

Deportation is a severe consequence for any crime, especially for
persons who are here legally and rooted to the United States by culture,
language, family, and work. Treating immigrants like criminals, but
without the procedural protections afforded criminals or comparable
opportunities for judicial review, presents a serious judicial and constitutional concern. 117 While many scholars have observed that the criminalization of immigration law has been asymmetric, 118 the question of
how to respond to this inequality presents its own problems. Some urge
that immigration law should remain faithful to its civil origins, i.e., by
resisting the trend towards criminalization. 119 This may be unrealistic at
least with respect to removal of aggravated felons, which accounts for a
large portion of removals and involves no discretionary opportunity for
relief by the immigration officials once the charge has been filed. Others argue that immigrants in quasi-criminal removal proceedings should
be afforded criminal or quasi-criminal procedural protections. 120 This
concept presents practical and theoretical questions about the overlap
and uniqueness of criminal and immigration proceedings. Which criminal rights should be applied? What is the source of those rights? How
would they apply in an immigration court setting? On this point, scholars have argued that Sixth Amendment criminal rights could apply if
immigration proceedings were simply reclassified as criminal, 121 and,
short of that, the Court in Padilla has opened the door to enhanced
rights under the Fifth Amendment that could serve similar purposes.122
Still others have observed the gaps and inefficiencies of these overlapping adjudication systems. 123 In these analyses, criminal procedural
protections are usually deemed the gold standard and superior to Fifth
Amendment due process protections, which tend to be more flexible and
forgiving. 124

117
118

Legomsky, supra note 7.
Chacón, supra note 7, at 135 n.1; Legomsky, supra note 7; Markowitz, supra note 3, at
1339–47.
119 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1339–47
120 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1467–72; Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1334.
121 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1472–73.
122 Id. (arguing that Padilla supports the “Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment” which “embodies
both the flexible due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment and—for at least certain types of
deportation—the more specific protections of the Sixth Amendment”); Markowitz, supra note 3,
at 1360–61.
123 See generally Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131 (2002).
124 Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1472–73.
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Against this background, the option remains that the Fifth
Amendment provides a superior vehicle to securing procedural protections for noncitizens facing removal on the basis of prior criminal conviction. This approach is grounded in the Fifth Amendment due process
concepts—which clearly apply in immigration proceedings—and animated by concerns about the unique issues that arise when immigration
courts detain, process, and deport noncitizens based on their prior convictions. Charting a new path specifically tailored to immigration law
allows courts to create protections that are protective of immigrants and
specifically tailored to the immigration issues they face, while ensuring
judicial review of immigration decisions. This approach is feasible under core principles recognized by the Supreme Court in its immigration
jurisprudence.
II. A JUDICIAL REVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR CREATING PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court has asserted a dynamic role for the judiciary in
immigration matters, especially those involving prior criminal convictions. The Court has carefully acted to safeguard judicial review even in
the face of congressional efforts to strip the court of such power. The
Court has affirmed that courts are the arbiters of constitutional issues
(including due process) and statutory interpretation. Recognizing the
interests at stake in detention and removal proceedings, the Court has
created general procedural rules to ensure due process protection, while
being sensitive to the policy decisions at stake in immigration proceedings. On matters of statutory interpretation, the Court defers to the immigration agency on matters of immigration law, while crediting judicial expertise in such areas as constitutional law, statutory construction,
and, significantly, criminal law.
These core concepts reinforce that reviewing courts serve an important function in innovating procedural safeguards for noncitizens in
removal proceedings. Such protections need not rely on criminal procedure or a classification of immigration proceedings as civil or criminal.
Rather, they can instead be interposed judicially by interpreting immigration statutes to benefit the noncitizen, promote transparency and
judicial review, and avoid constitutional concerns, or, if needed, to ensure fairness as a matter of constitutional due process. The judicial practice of using statutory interpretation, especially the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, to protect noncitizens in immigration proceedings is
not new, though the criminal law emphasis in contemporary immigra-
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tion law provides a new facet to this practice. 125 Immigration procedural
protections could prove more effective than their criminal procedure
counterparts if specifically tailored to the issues noncitizens face in this
administrative process and with sensitivity to the government’s policy
concerns on immigration matters. 126 And while due process violations
are traditionally reviewed on a case-by-case basis, the Court has been
willing to craft due process–based rules to apply to a class of noncitizens in removal proceedings, thus creating a framework that avoids
foreseeable or repeat violations.
A.

Preserving Judicial Review: Constitutional and
Statutory Expertise

While the Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to interfere in immigration decisions, it has long reviewed them on due process
grounds, and has resisted Congress’s efforts to eliminate judicial review
entirely. The Court has instead inserted itself into immigration matters
in ways that are procedural in nature, take into account systemic immigration problems, and may affect outcomes in immigration court. Judicial review of immigration decisions is on a pathway to become more,
not less, rigorous. In this evolution, traditional reasons for shielding
immigration decisions from rigorous judicial review might be seen as a
basis for developing immigration-specific interventions tailored to
agency goals and the problems facing noncitizens in immigration
courts.
1.

Traditional Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions

Several background principles inform judicial review of immigration decisions and the basic question of whether courts should defer to
the Executive on immigration matters. The Court early on established
125 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548–49 (1990) (arguing
that aliens tend to receive more favorable treatment when courts rely on statutory interpretation,
especially the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, based on “phantom constitutional norms”).
126 Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (describing a central feature of “immigration
exceptionalism” as “the plenary power doctrine, which severely limits judicial review when a
government decision regarding a noncitizen’s entry or continued presence in the United States is
challenged on constitutional grounds”). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (2000)
(commenting on Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 257 (2000)).
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that the political branches, namely, Congress and the Executive, have
plenary power over immigration. 127 Constitutionally, this broad power
is usually justified under Congress’s power to conduct foreign affairs,
though that provision does not mention immigration. 128 In Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court concluded that in light of the federal government’s power to regulate immigration, immigration decisions were nonjusticiable political questions and “conclusive upon the judiciary.” 129
Soon, however, concerns about this unchecked power over immigration led to minimal due process review. Several Justices, dissenting
in an 1893 immigration case, questioned whether a statute that allowed
immigration officials to seize and deport Chinese residents without
judicial review violated due process. 130 A few years later in Japanese
Immigrant Case, the Court permitted review of a noncitizen’s due
process claim, but did not find a due process violation. 131 In that case,
the noncitizen, four days after her arrival, was ordered by immigration
officials to be arrested and removed on the suspicion that she was a
pauper and would become a public charge. 132 The Court recognized that
an alien residing here, even if here illegally, was entitled as a matter of
due process to be heard on her right to be and remain in the United
States. 133 The Court concluded that the petitioner had not been denied
the opportunity to be heard, and that the immigration inspector’s decision, having never been appealed to the Secretary, was “final and conclusive.” 134 Japanese Immigrant Case established the Court would review constitutional challenges to agency removal decisions based on
due process grounds. 135
127 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1634 (1992) (citing Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)).
128 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 181 (5th ed. 2003) (“The federal government’s power to conduct foreign affairs . . . has
led the courts to invalidate state statutes that attempt to regulate immigration.”).
129 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1634 (citing Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609);
see also Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (2008) (discussing the plenary power doctrine in Chinese Exclusion Case).
130 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1635 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893)).
131 Id. at 1637 (citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)).
132 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 87.
133 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1637 (citing Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101).
134 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 102.
135 See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1638. Over the years, the Court has distinguished between those aliens who are here facing deportation and those who are excludable at the border. Id.
at 1643 (discussing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
(upholding the exclusion without a hearing on national security grounds a returning permanent
resident who briefly returned to Eastern Europe to visit his dying mother behind “the Iron Curtain”) and Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982) (recognizing that a legal permanent
resident, returning from a brief trip abroad, is entitle to due process when threatened with deportation)).
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For decades courts reviewed immigration removal decisions solely
in habeas review. 136 The Immigration Act of 1917 provided that a deportation order by the Attorney General “shall be final,” and the Court
had interpreted that provision to preclude “judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution.”137
Immigration orders were not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) until 1952, 138 and in 1961 Congress replaced district
court APA review with initial-deportation-order review in courts of
appeals. 139 At the same time, Congress specifically preserved federal
habeas review on statutory and constitutional challenges to deportation
orders. 140
While courts had a limited role in reviewing final deportation orders, they played an important role in deciding whether convicted noncitizens would be subject to removal at all. 141 Under the 1917 Act,
which authorized deportation based on certain convictions, sentencing
courts had an important procedure, known as a judicial recommendation
against deportation (JRAD). The JRAD authorized the sentencing judge
in both state and federal prosecutions to recommend “that such
alien . . . not be deported,” either at the time of sentencing or within
thirty days thereafter. 142 The Court’s decision was understood to be
“part of the sentencing” process 143 and was binding on the agency. 144
The JRAD was codified and continued to exist until 1990. 145 During
136
137
138

Zadvydas v. Ashcroft, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 230, 232 n.4, 234 (1953).
Id. at 235 (holding that APA did not apply to immigration cases, reaffirming that a noncitizen “may attack a deportation only by habeas corpus,” and reaffirming that deportation orders
“remain immune to direct attack”). But see id. at 236 (acknowledging precedent for litigant to
challenge a deportation order on the basis of their status).
139 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687–88 (citing Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5, 75 Stat. 651 (repealed
1996)).
140 Id. at 687–88 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51–52 (1955)); see also Act of
Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, sec. 106(a), § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651 (1961) (repealed 1996).
141 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479–80 (discussing JRAD procedure).
142 The full text of the JRAD provision read as follows:
That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor
shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing
such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence
or within thirty days thereafter . . . make a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor
that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act.
Id. at 1479 n.3 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006))).
143 Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986).
144 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479 (explaining that the statute was “consistently . . . interpreted as
giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should
be disregarded as a basis for deportation” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Janvier,
793 F.2d at 452)).
145 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“Congress first circumscribed
the JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Congress
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that period, the class of deportable offenses had grown, but noncitizens
could still apply to the sentencing judge for the JRAD or the agency for
discretionary relief from removal. Importantly, the JRAD ensured that
judges retained discretion to prevent deportation of convicted noncitizens on a case-by-case basis.
In 1996, Congress enacted the major immigration changes that
dramatically increased the stakes on prior criminal convictions. By this
time, judicial relief from deportation using the JRAD had been eliminated, leaving deportation or “removal” 146 decisions solely to immigration officials. The 1996 laws greatly expanded the list of “aggravated
felonies,” made them automatically deportable offenses, and eliminated
the Attorney General’s discretion to grant relief from removal, such as
voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, or withholding of removal
based on asylum-related concerns. 147 Congress also enacted several
provisions to eliminate all judicial review of immigration removal decisions. 148 This sweeping immigration reform signaled a new era in immigration enforcement and policy. The judicial backlash that ensued
laid the groundwork for more robust scrutiny of immigration decisions
by courts.
2.

Judicial Protection of Judicial Review of
Immigration Decisions

The Supreme Court’s cognizance of its important constitutional
role in reviewing immigration matters is evident in its treatment of removal orders. In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court held that habeas review remained available to persons challenging the constitutionality of removal
orders, despite new statutory provisions that could have been interpreted
to eliminate any judicial review of immigration decisions. The case
involved a challenge to the application of comprehensive immigration
entirely eliminated it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation . . . .”).
146 Beginning in 1996, Congress has used the term “removal” to refer to deportation. Padilla,
130 S. Ct. at 1480 n.6 (citing Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.1 (2001)).
147 Id. at 1480 (“Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation . . .
had been exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period
prior to 1996 . . . .” (citations omitted)).
148 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). The IIRIRA eliminated direct judicial review of
a petition by an alien deemed removable for a criminal conviction, though courts still retained
power to determine their own jurisdiction and consider in that inquiry whether the alien was
removable. See, e.g., Zavaleta-Gallegos v. INS, 261 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). In 2005,
Congress expanded direct judicial review of legal and constitutional claims in petitions by people
ordered removed on the basis of a prior criminal conviction, and limited habeas review of final
deportation orders. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 106, 119 Stat.
231, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006)). The REAL ID Act applied retroactively
to all final removal orders issues before, on or after May 11. 2005. Id. at 311.
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law changes enacted in 1996 under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. 149 In
St. Cyr, the noncitizen (St. Cyr) had been convicted of a drug offense
that made him deportable before the 1996 laws took effect. St. Cyr
would have been eligible for discretionary relief from deportation at the
time of his conviction,150 but by the time of his removal proceedings a
year later, such discretionary relief had been eliminated under the new
laws. St. Cyr brought a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing
that the new laws should not apply to him because his guilty plea became final before they were enacted. 151
As a threshold matter, the Court was faced with deciding if it had
jurisdiction to hear the case in light of four new provisions that appeared to eliminate the judicial review of final deportation orders. 152 As
a starting point, the Court recognized that the issue presented was
“purely a question of law,” presenting no factual issues or challenge to
the exercise of discretionary agency authority. 153 This legal question,
more importantly, raised a serious constitutional concern. The government argued that the new provisions eliminated judicial review so there
existed “no judicial forum available to decide” the legal issue. 154 Construing these statutes to eliminate habeas jurisdiction would give rise to
“substantial constitutional questions” under the Suspension Clause,
which limits Congress’s power to suspend the writ. 155
The Court ultimately avoided this “difficult and significant” constitutional question by holding that the new laws did not eliminate habeas
review of immigration decisions. 156 Toward that result, the Court applied three core concepts of statutory interpretation: it required a clear
legislative statement to repeal habeas review, it applied the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to preserve judicial review, and it construed the
149
150
151
152

St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id.
See Anne R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal
Habeas Corpus, 68 MD. L. REV. 545, 593 (discussing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309–10). One provision
of AEDPA, § 401(e)—though entitled “ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS
CORPUS”—merely repealed a judicial-review provision without mentioning the habeas statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2241. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 309. Three other provisions were contained in IIRIRA: one
specified the law applicable to judicial review of a final order of removal in the reviewing court,
see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(1); a second required consolidation of judicial review of all questions of
law and fact, including the application of statutory and constitutional provisions, in an appeal of a
final order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9); and a third states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumerated criminal offenses, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
311–14.
153 Id. at 298.
154 Id. at 294–99.
155 The Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, provides: “The Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”
156 Traum, supra note 152, at 593–94.
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new provisions against a long history permitting judicial review of the
legality of immigration decisions.
First, the Court rejected any repeal of habeas jurisdiction by implication and insisted on a “clear statement” that Congress intended to
repeal habeas review. 157 This rule was supported, the Court said, because there is a “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action,” and the Suspension Clause is a limitation on Congress’s authority. 158
Second, the Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
to preserve judicial review and to avoid having to decide a “serious
Suspension Clause issue.” 159 The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is
a canon of statutory construction that requires courts to construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional problems if an alternative interpretation is fairly possible. 160 Here, the elimination of judicial or habeas review presented a serious constitutional issue because some “judicial
intervention in deportation cases” is unquestionably “required by the
Constitution.” 161 Rather than decide a thorny Suspension Clause issue,
the Court opted to preserve judicial review.
Finally, the Court looked to historical practice. Habeas corpus had
“always been available” to review the legality of executive detention.
Before 1952 habeas review was the sole means of judicial review of
final deportation orders. And at least since 1961 habeas review of immigration decisions was not limited to constitutional issues, but included other questions of law, even those arising in the context of discretionary relief. 162 “At its historical core,” the Court stated, “the writ of
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.” 163

157
158

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299.
Id. (“[W]hen a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’
[sic] power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”); see also Traum,
supra note 152, at 590 (“The Suspension Clause is a limitation on Congress's power to legislate
and appears in Article I, Section 9, with other limitations on congressional authority.”) (citing
Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 566 (2002)).
159 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–301.
160 Id. at 299–300; see also Motomura, supra note 125, at 561, 564 (observing that courts
commonly apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as a statutory interpretation canon, in
the immigration context this doctrine conflicts with the constitutional notion that executive power
over immigration is plenary and nonreviewable).
161 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
162 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679–80 (2001); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07.
163 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n.14 (“At common law, ‘[w]hile habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court’s jurisdictional competency, an attack on an
executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1238 (1970))).
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St. Cyr laid important groundwork for robust review of immigration decisions and executive detention generally. 164 The Court described
its traditional habeas review function broadly, observing that courts in
habeas were not relegated to simply determining whether immigration
statutes or individualized immigration decisions violate the Constitution, but also redressed erroneous application or interpretation of immigration statutes. 165 The Court’s authority to construe immigration statutes is aided by canons of statutory construction that, as a practical
matter, may make it more likely to side with the noncitizen. 166 This is
because when the application of statutory canons of construction resolve
statutory ambiguities, there is no occasion to defer to the agency’s own
interpretation. 167 Thus, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and “the
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien” may cause the Court to favor noncitizens when interpreting immigration statutes. 168
Importantly, in safeguarding its habeas review of immigration decisions, the Court in St. Cyr was marking its own territory, defining its
constitutional role in the face of Congress’s broad immigration authority. The Court was more concerned with policing the limits of Congress’s power under the Suspension Clause (an issue it ultimately
avoided) than with respecting the breadth of Congress’s plenary power
over immigration matters (an issue it never even mentioned). 169 Subsequently, the Court has defended its traditional judicial powers in the

164 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (citing St. Cyr for historical background on habeas review of executive detention); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004).
165 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302–03.
166 See Motomura, supra note 125, at 548 (observing that aliens receive favorable treatment
when courts interpret immigration statutes using “subconstitutional norms”).
167 St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 n.45 (rejecting the need for Chevron deference, see Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the Court “only
defer[s] . . . to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal ‘tools of statutory
construction,’ are ambiguous”); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (“It is not at
all unusual to give a statute's ambiguous language a limiting construction called for by one of the
statute's applications, even though other of the statute's applications, standing alone, would not
support the same limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”) (citing,
inter alia, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 11–12 n.8, which explains that, “if a statute has criminal
applications, ‘the rule of lenity applies’ to the Court's interpretation of the statute even in immigration cases ‘[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its
application in a criminal or noncriminal context’” (alteration in original)).
168 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
169 Neuman, supra note 158, at 561–62 (noting that “[t]he ‘plenary power’ of Congress over
immigration played no explicit role in the opinions,” in that “neither the majority nor the dissent
argued that the force of the Suspension Clause was diminished in the field of immigration law”);
see also Legomsky, supra note 126, at 312 (“[I]f the issue on the merits presents an important
enough general principle, the Court will find a way around the principle of plenary congressional
power.”).
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immigration context to ensure that noncitizens receive adequate process
and access to judicial review. 170
The Court’s review of criminal issues in the immigration context
reinforces that it is constantly policing the boundaries of Congress’s and
the Executive’s immigration authority. St. Cyr suggests concerns about
separation of powers and statutory interpretation. In criminal cases, as
discussed below, these boundaries recognize a separation between criminal (involving federal law and state sovereignty) and immigration authority and competence. The Court appears to be confining immigration
authority to matters within its traditional expertise and resolving statutory interpretation issues without deference to agency interpretation in
many instances.
B.

Zavydas: Creating General Rules to Ensure Due Process
and Minimize Judicial Interference

The doctrine of constitutional avoidance has been used to powerful
effect. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 171 which was decided in the same term as
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court created a statute-based rule limiting postremoval detention to six months in order to prevent due process concerns about persons who may face indefinite detention. 172 Zadvydas
provides a blueprint for innovating procedural protections on a classwide basis to avoid recurring, foreseeable due process problems in the
immigration context. The Court’s reason for such a clear and protective
rule was premised, at least in part, on its desire to avoid judicial intervention in sensitive immigration matters. This kind of immigrationspecific, prophylactic due process rule could be replicated for other
aspects of immigration.
The Court in Zadvydas confronted the problem of indefinite detainees who, despite having been ordered removed, were still in custody
because they could not be repatriated to another country. 173 The consolidated cases involved two detainees, both of whom were ordered removed based on prior criminal convictions. Zadvydas was born in 1948
to Lithuanian parents in a displaced-persons camp in Germany and im-

170 See Kucan v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (holding that IIRIRA did not eliminate
judicial review of motion to reopen removal proceedings, a longstanding “‘important safeguard’
that assures that the alien’s claims have been accorded a reasonable hearing”); Nken v. Holder,
129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (affirming judicial power to stay removal proceedings in order to facilitate
judicial review and rejecting the government’s argument that such stays violated prohibition on
injunctive relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)).
171 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
172 Id. at 701.
173 Id. at 684–87.
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migrated to the United States at age eight. 174 Kim Ho Ma, who was born
in Cambodia, fled with his family to Thailand and the Philippines before coming to the United States at age seven. A post-removal statute
required mandatory detention after entry of a final removal order and
during the ninety-day removal period. 175 Detention was permitted
beyond the ninety-day removal period and could continue indefinitely,
provided the matter of detention was reviewed within a year or earlier if
conditions changed.176 Zadvydas and Ma each were detained well
beyond the ninety-day period and filed habeas actions challenging the
government’s authority to detain them indefinitely under the statute. 177
The Court in Zadvydas relied on constitutional avoidance to create
a reasonable time limit on post-removal detention. Because detention
“lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause, a
statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem. 178 The fact that this detention was civil rather
than criminal heightened the Court’s concern. Criminal detention is
imposed “with adequate procedural protections,” but here there was “no
sufficiently strong special justification” for indefinite civil detention and
insufficient procedural protections afforded to the detainees. 179 The
Court rejected the government’s arguments that “alien status itself can
justify indefinite detention,” reiterating that noncitizens who have entered the country are entitled to due process protection. 180 Congress’s
plenary power, the Court said, “is subject to important constitutional
limitations.” 181 Finding no clear intent to authorize indefinite detention,
the Court interpreted the statute to contain a reasonable duration limit of
six months on post-removal detention. 182
The six-month rule adopted by the Court was intended to facilitate
Executive action on immigration matters that satisfy due process without judicial interference. Under traditional habeas review powers, courts
have authority to review case-by-case the lawfulness of executive detention without trial. 183 Here, the Court acknowledged that judicial interference in immigration matters was undesirable, given “the greater immigration-related expertise” of the Executive Branch, its “primary
responsibility” over immigration matters, the serious concerns inherent
in enforcing complex immigration laws, and “the Nation’s need to

174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 684–85.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(2) (West 2011).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 690–92.
Id. at 692–94.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 699.
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speak with one voice on immigration matters.” 184 Ordinary principles of
judicial review, the Court explained, “counsel judges to give expert
agencies decision making leeway in matters that invoke their expertise,”
including sensitive foreign judgments affecting repatriation. 185 The sixmonth rule, the Court explained, would “recognize some presumptively
reasonable period of detention” and “limit the occasions when courts
will need” to interfere in detention matters in individualized cases. 186
The Court specifically referenced presumptions in criminal law that
operate similarly, by creating a constitutional safe harbor that minimizes
case-by-case judicial oversight. 187
Zadvydas provides a framework for innovating procedural protections in the immigration context to avoid due process violations and
minimize judicial interference. There, the Court recognized that the sixmonth rule would affect a class of individuals subject to a post-removal
statute. Using the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court interposed a reasonable time limit on the post-removal statute to avoid repeat, foreseeable due process violations. The post-removal, possibly
indefinite detention was civil in nature and had no criminal analog. The
Court’s approach of creating a prophylactic rule establishing a presumptively constitutional duration of post-removal detention was drawn from
criminal procedure law. But the rationale for this rule—to permit the
Executive Branch leeway in immigration matters and limit judicial
oversight—was tailored to the immigration context and unique importance of reviewing executive, not criminal, detention.
C.

Immigration Court’s Inexpertise in Criminal Law

The focus of immigration law on criminal law issues requires immigration courts to determine legal issues outside their traditional area
of expertise. While immigration law has for nearly a century attached
immigration consequences to criminal convictions, for much of that
period this practice was limited to certain drug offenses, very serious
crimes, and “crimes involving moral turpitude,” a broad immigration

184
185
186
187

Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379–80 (1966) (plurality opinion), which
“adopt[s] [a] rule, based on definition of “petty offense” in United States Code, that right to jury
trial extends to all cases in which sentence of six months or greater is imposed,” and County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991), which “adopt[s] [a] presumption, based on
[the] lower court[’s] estimate of time needed to process arrestee, that [a] 48-hour delay in probable-cause hearing after arrest is reasonable, hence constitutionally permissible”).
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law descriptor. 188 The operation of criminal law within immigration has
greatly evolved, especially under the expanded “aggravated felony”
definition enacted in 1996. Today immigration courts analyze a wide
range of state and federal convictions, applying state and federal criminal laws and evaluating criminal records of conviction to determine
what qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” This definitional analysis is a
large and complex undertaking. The definition of “aggravated felony”
describes over twenty separate offense categories; it applies to any qualifying state, federal, or foreign conviction; and a prior conviction is
properly analyzed in light of the law of the jurisdiction where it was
obtained as well as under the applicable federal law referenced in the
definition. 189 This aspect of immigration law requires careful analysis of
criminal law by immigration courts that lack jurisdiction over or institutional expertise in criminal adjudication.
The Supreme Court has in several cases rejected the government’s
expansive interpretation of the aggravated felony definition. In addition
to settling some very specific aspects of aggravated felony analysis,
these cases hint at broader themes about the proper role of immigration
courts deciding criminal law issues in a civil proceeding. These cases
show that the Executive Branch is not accorded deference on criminal
law matters outside its area of expertise. Rather, the Supreme Court
appears to police the boundaries of the government’s immigration authority based on concerns about criminal procedural protections, state
sovereignty, federal law uniformity, and due process. The Court’s rulings reflect an overarching concern about the severe immigration consequences that stem from criminal convictions imposed in a process that
is closely related but procedurally divorced from the original criminal
proceedings, and which lacks the same protections. The Court’s cabining of immigration expertise and assertion of traditional judicial oversight could prove beneficial to noncitizens. Suspicions about the competence of immigration courts to handle criminal law issues may also raise
questions about whether affording noncitizens full criminal procedural
protections in immigration proceedings would improve outcomes.

188 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (2010) (noting that Congress has never defined
the term “moral turpitude”).
189 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2011); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 5 (2004)
(describing the Florida statute of conviction and federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 16, referenced in the
aggravated felony definition) (“The question here is whether § 16 can be interpreted to include
such [state law] offenses.”).
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Leocal: Interpreting Federal Criminal Law

The Supreme Court has emphasized that aggravated felony determinations that turn on the meaning of a federal criminal statute must be
construed in favor of the noncitizen and consistent with other federal
criminal laws. In Leocal v. Ashcroft 190 the Court examined whether the
petitioner’s Florida felony conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol and causing serious bodily injury was a “crime of violence”
under 18 U.S.C. § 16, making it an aggravated felony. 191 The petitioner
was a legal permanent resident who had lived in the United States for
twenty years before his conviction. 192 After causing an accident that
injured two people, he was charged with two counts of felony DUI
causing serious bodily injury under a Florida statute, pleaded guilty to
both counts, and was sentenced to prison. 193 In subsequent removal
proceedings, he was found to have an “aggravated felony” conviction
and ordered removed.
In Leocal the Court interpreted the “crime of violence” in 18
U.S.C. § 16 to require a reckless or intentional mental state, rejecting
the government’s position that it included negligence-based driving
offenses. “Crime of violence” is defined in the criminal code and referenced in the definition of “aggravated felony.” 194 The issue in Leocal
was whether a conviction under a Florida statute punishing DUI causing
serious bodily injury is, categorically, a “crime of violence,” namely, as
an offense that “has as an element” 195 or “by its nature, involves a substantial risk” 196 of the “use” of physical force. The Florida statute, like
many similar state statutes, requires proof of causation of injury, but
does not require proof of any particular mental state. Some other states
require proof of negligence. 197 In Leocal, the Court construed § 16 to
require “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental

190
191
192

543 U.S. 1.
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining “crime of violence”).
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 4 (noting that Leocal entered the United States in 1980, became a legal
permanent resident in 1987, and was convicted in 2000).
193 Id. at 3 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2003)).
194 See id. at 6 (“18 U.S.C. § 16 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, which broadly reformed the federal criminal code in such areas as sentencing, bail, and
drug enforcement . . . . Section 16 has since been incorporated into a variety of statutory provisions, both criminal and noncriminal.”); see also id. at 4 (“[8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)] defines
‘aggravated felony’ to include . . . ‘a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but
not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year’” (second alteration in original)).
195 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006).
196 See id. § 16(b).
197 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8 nn.5–6.
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conduct.” 198 As a practical matter, the holding in Leocal meant that the
“crime of violence” definition of aggravated felony does not include
DUI offenses.
The statutory analysis in Leocal reflects that the Court interprets a
criminal statute using core criminal statutory analysis, even in the context of reviewing an immigration decision. This stance explains the
Court’s rejection of mere negligence as a criminal mental state and its
repudiation of the notion that “crime of violence” could include such
common DUI–injury offenses. Criminal law usually demands more, as
the Court stated: “[W]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining
the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence.’” 199 The Court reasoned
that other immigration provisions provided evidence that Congress did
not intend to include DUI offenses as crimes of violence. 200 Though the
Court found no ambiguity, it noted that
we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in
petitioner’s favor. Although here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and
noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies. 201

The Court refused to “shoehorn” a DUI offense “into statutory sections
where it does not fit.” 202
Leocal reinforces that criminal laws are interpreted as such no matter where they appear. In Leocal, this meant that the immigration statute
was construed narrowly in favor of a noncitizen in immigration proceedings. The rule of lenity sounds in a due process–based concern
about clear notice about the scope of a criminal statute. 203 In Leocal, the
Court’s “ordinary” and “natural” reading of the statute was not merely
procedural, as it yielded a substantive result: it limited the scope of the
aggravated felony definition and meant that a class of noncitizens would
not be subject to permanent exile.204

198
199
200
201

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 11 n.8 (citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18
(1992) (plurality opinion), which applied the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting,
because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be interpreted consistently with its
criminal applications).
202 Id. at 13.
203 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (stating that the rule of lenity
“ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered”).
204 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.

TRAUM.33.2

12/19/2011 10:55 PM

526

C A R D O Z O LA W R E V I E W
2.

[Vol. 33:2

Lopez: Uniformly Applying Federal Drug Statutes

The Supreme Court again relied on basic statutory interpretation
rules in twice rejecting the government’s expansive treatment of prior
drug crimes as aggravated felonies. 205 The aggravated felony definition
includes any drug trafficking crime “as defined in 18 U.S.C. section
924(c),” which means “any felony punishable under,” inter alia, “the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. sec. 801, et seq.).” 206 In Lopez v.
Gonzales and Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, the Court held that the
immigration court’s analysis is restricted to the actual conviction, which
must be a felony under federal law. As in Leocal, these decisions draw
on procedural and definitional concepts but have a substantive component: by limiting the scope of the aggravated definition, many noncitizens convicted of drug crimes will not be subject to permanent removal.
In Lopez, a legal permanent resident was convicted in South Dakota of aiding and abetting another person’s possession of cocaine, a felony under state law. 207 Under federal drug laws, mere drug possession is
not a felony. 208 The government asserted that this conduct was nonetheless “punishable” under the federal drug laws, albeit as a misdemeanor,
which was sufficient to deem it an aggravated felony. 209 Rejecting this
reading, the Court held that a state offense qualifies as a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substance Act” only if it proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony under that federal law. 210
To interpret the term “illicit trafficking,” the Court relied on familiar statutory themes of notice, predictability, and uniformity. Harkening
to its construction of “crime of violence” in Leocal, the Court in Lopez
relied on an everyday and commonsense reading of the statute: “ordinarily trafficking means some sort of commercial dealing,” not mere possession. 211 The Court rejected the notion that a federal-law definition
could depend on the vagaries of state law, a proposition it has carefully
developed in the criminal-law context. Under the government’s expansive reading, immigration judges’ evaluation of prior convictions would
turn on state law, not the federal drug scheme explicitly referenced in
205 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding that misdemeanor
simple drug possession conviction under Texas law that could have, but was not actually charged
as a recidivist offense, was not a felony under federal drug law); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47
(2006) (holding that South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine
was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws).
206 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581.
207 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 51 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-5 (1988)).
208 Id. (holding that the South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of
cocaine was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws).
209 Id. at 53.
210 Id. at 60.
211 See id. at 53–55.
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the aggravated felony definition. 212 This approach, if adopted, also
would impact federal sentencing provisions, which rely on the aggravated felony definition for enhancement purposes. 213 Federal drug laws,
not state laws, the Court explained, supply the relevant standard for
evaluating prior drug convictions. 214 If Congress intended to create a
state-by-state approach, it clearly could have said so. 215
3.

Carachuri-Rosendo: Respecting State
Criminal Convictions

In a second case analyzing a prior drug conviction, the Court held
that the aggravated felony determination must be based on the immigrant’s actual conviction, not the immigration court’s own assessment
of his criminal conduct. 216 In Carachuri-Rosendo, a lawful permanent
resident who had resided in the United States since he was five years
old faced permanent deportation in his mid-twenties after conviction on
two misdemeanor drug possession charges in Texas. 217 The first conviction for marijuana possession resulted in a twenty-day jail sentence, and
the second for possessing one tablet of Xanax without a prescription led
to a ten-day jail sentence. 218 After the second conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings asserting that the second conviction
was an aggravated felony. Though simple drug possession is not a felony under federal law, it can be charged as a felony if the defendant has
one or more prior drug convictions. 219 In such cases, the government
must notice and prove the prior conviction, and the defendant has an
opportunity to challenge its validity. 220 In Carachuri-Rosendo, the government argued that a noncitizen’s second possession conviction was
“punishable” as a felony drug offense because he could have been
charged federally as a recidivist drug offender. 221 The Court rejected
this reading, holding that because the immigrant’s actual conviction was
for simple possession and had not been enhanced based on the fact of a
prior conviction, the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony.

212
213
214
215

Id at 55–56.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59 (highlighting that injecting a state law analysis would yield untoward results
depending on the harsh or lenient treatment of drug possession offenses under different state
laws).
216 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2580.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 2587–88 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a), 851 (2006)).
220 Id.
221 Id.
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Carachuri-Rosendo, like Lopez and Leocal before it, underscores
the Court’s role in statutory interpretation of aggravated felonies provisions and seems to caution against expansive interpretations. The
Court’s analysis in Carachuri-Rosendo focused on three points: the
statutory text of the immigration law, the actual record of conviction,
and the general rule of lenity applied to ambiguities in criminal statutes,
including those that are referenced in immigration laws. In CarachuriRosendo, the Court began by giving the statutory terms a “commonsense” and “everyday understanding” of the term “aggravated felony”
and its reference to felonies punishable under federal drugs laws. 222 The
Court rejected the government’s “unorthodox” position (of treating a
petty possession charge as an aggravated felony), saying it “did not fit
easily into the everyday understanding” of a recidivist drug possession
offense. 223 The Court emphasized that the statutory text refers to a person “convicted of a[n] aggravated felony,” requiring that “the conviction itself is our starting place, not what might have or could have been
charged.” 224 Here, the record contained no finding of the fact of his
prior drug offense. 225
The Court interpreted the aggravated felony definition in a manner
consistent with the federal drug laws. 226 The same conduct would have
yielded a misdemeanor sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines, and the government could not produce one example of similar
conduct having ever been the basis for a felony recidivist charge in federal court. 227 In terms of statutory interpretation, the Court rejected the
government’s expansive definition of a criminal statute against an alien,
stating that “ambiguities in criminal statutes referenced in immigration
laws should be construed in the noncitizen’s favor. And here the critical
language appears in a criminal statute.” 228
Carachuri-Rosendo also makes clear that immigration courts making aggravated felony determinations are not criminal courts in the first
instance. Rather, their task is a purely legal one: deciding the legal significance of a conviction. In this task, the record of that state or federal
conviction binds the immigration court. Importantly, this is a reminder
that immigration courts are not adjudicating guilt or imposing sentence
and must respect the decisions of state and federal prosecutors in charging and resolving criminal cases. 229 The immigration court “cannot, ex
222
223
224
225
226

Id. at 2585 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 2586.
Id.
Id. at 2589 (“It seems the Government’s argument is inconsistent with common practice in
the federal courts.”).
227 Id.
228 Id. (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2006)).
229 Id. at 2586–88.
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post, enhance the state offense of record just because facts known to it
would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal
law.” 230 Hence, the immigration court was powerless to attach immigration consequences to a state court conviction based on facts that could
have authorized (but in fact did not) a higher penalty under state or federal law. 231
In addition to comporting with the statute, constraining the immigration court’s role also accords respect to the state-court conviction.
The Court accorded “great significance” to the procedural safeguards
required for a federal recidivist drug possession offense, which require
notice, proof, and an opportunity to challenge the prior conviction, and
reflect the important role of prosecutorial discretion. 232 The government’s suggestion that such procedures could be satisfied in immigration court was rejected. 233 The prosecutor’s decision to pursue a recidivist enhancement, the Court explained, is equivalent to a charging
decision, i.e., it is not automatic but a calculated choice by the prosecutor, which must be afforded deference. 234 In this particular case, the
record showed “the prosecutor specifically elected to ‘abandon’ a recidivist enhancement under state law.” 235 Allowing immigration judges to
apply recidivist enhancements that were not part of the original conviction would “denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors to
execute the laws of those sovereigns.” 236
Confining aggravated felony determinations to the record of conviction protects immigrants who have negotiated criminal cases to avoid
certain deportation consequences. Noncitizens seek to resolve criminal
cases to avoid or minimize immigration consequences. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky, “changes in our immigration
laws have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.” 237 The Court in Padilla stated that “deportation is an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.” 238 In Padilla, the Court recognized that criminal defendants
have a right to effective assistance of counsel about risk or certainty of
deportation as a consequence of conviction. 239 The threat of deportation
is a “powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not
230 Id. at 2586 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 247 (1998) (holding
that fact of recidivism is not an element of the offense requiring a right to jury trial)).
231 Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2586–87.
232 Id. at 2588.
233 Id. at 2587–88.
234 Id. at 2588.
235 Id. (citing to state court judgment).
236 Id.
237 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1486.
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mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal that does.” 240 Plea
agreements are contracts enforceable against the government. 241 This
value would be lost, however, if the immigration court could assert its
own view of how the noncitizen’s conduct could have been prosecuted
under federal law, as the government urged in Carachuri-Rosendo. The
Court’s insistence that the immigration court’s aggravated felony inquiry is limited to the record of conviction ensures that the plea negotiated and the record created in criminal court is honored in subsequent
immigration proceedings. This is especially critical because while the
noncitizen has appointed counsel in criminal proceedings, he may not
have counsel in subsequent immigration proceedings to adjudicate the
immigration consequences.
By strictly construing criminal law statutes, the Supreme Court has
cabined immigration courts’ leeway in adjudicating aggravated felonies.
In Leocal, Lopez, and Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court rejected the government’s expansive application of the aggravated felony definition. In
these cases, the Court’s role as the arbiter of statutory interpretation is
multifaceted: ensuring predictability and uniformity, resolving statutory
ambiguities in favor of the noncitizen, and respecting the separation of
criminal and immigration courts in terms of their function and sovereign
interests. These themes reinforce that while immigration consequences
are integral to the criminal process, these processes remain distinct.
Through judicial oversight, the Court monitors that immigration courts
stick to their proper, limited role.
These criminal immigration cases have procedural and substantive
effects. Due process typically involves alleged process deficiency. In
Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court limited the process that the immigration
court could undertake, insisting that its analysis was limited to statecourt record of conviction and rejecting the notion that it could address
procedural deficiencies in the underlying conviction by providing procedures in immigration court. 242 Such process restrictions on immigration courts highlight that criminal and immigration court processes are
not interchangeable. It also limits substantively the scope of the aggravated felony conviction. As a result of Lopez and Carachuri-Rosendo,
many low-level drug offenses do not qualify as aggravated felonies.

240
241

Id.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (holding that when prosecutor
breaches the plea agreement, defendant is entitled to remedy of specific performance to enforce
the contract), cited in Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009).
242 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587–88 (2010).
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III. IMMIGRATION LAW ON ITS OWN PATH
The Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence provides a judicial framework based in due process for developing broadly applicable
procedural protections for noncitizens in immigration court. This approach builds on firm ground: it is well established that noncitizens in
immigration proceedings are entitled to due process and that courts review due process issues arising in immigration proceedings. 243 In immigration law, procedural due process has served an important judicial
check on Congress’s plenary authority on immigration matters. 244 But
due process analysis has not yielded in immigration proceedings the
kind of standard procedural protections that have evolved under the
Sixth Amendment in criminal proceedings. This gap in procedural protections is partially explained by the classification of immigration law
as civil, not criminal. 245 Perhaps more important, a hallmark of due
process analysis in both the civil and criminal contexts is that it is flexible and generally turns on a case-by-case analysis of the facts. 246
Many criminal procedural rights are rooted in due process, including the right to counsel, 247 safeguards against involuntary confessions, 248 the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, 249 and the
right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 250 Some of these criminal
procedural rights evolved in the shadow of the Sixth Amendment,

243
244

Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
See Motomura, supra note 127, at 1665–71 (discussing cases in which procedural due
process operated as a substantive check on Congress’s authority, for example, to limit statute
mandating detention for an entire class of aliens).
245 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1307–08 (addressing classification of immigration law as civil,
not criminal, and differing approaches to procedural rights in civil and criminal law).
246 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing pre-Miranda
confession analysis under the due process clause as “‘judicial’ in its treatment of one case at a
time,” and “flexible in its ability to respond to the endless mutations of fact presented”).
247 Before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made applicable to the states, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), right-to-counsel claims were evaluated as due process
claims under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that
failure to appoint every indigent defendant accused in a state criminal prosecution did not necessarily violate due process); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that failure to appoint counsel in a capital case violated due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
248 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688–89 (1993) (“[O]ver the course of 30 years,
beginning with the decision in Brown v. Mississippi, we analyzed the admissibility of confessions
in such cases as a question of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
249 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
250 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
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which was not applied to the states before its gradual incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment during the 1960s. 251 Apart from such
specific rights, courts analyze whether particular factual circumstances
amount to a due process violation. 252 For example, involuntary confessions violate due process, and the Court’s analysis of them is fact specific, flexible, and case-by-case. 253 The requirement of Miranda warnings was a departure from constitutional due process analysis of
involuntary confessions because it created prophylactic rules based on a
presumption that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. 254 The
Miranda rules anticipated the recurring, foreseeable problem of involuntary confessions and created a presumptively constitutional safe harbor for police interrogations that would likely withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
In all procedural due process analysis lies the risk that the deficient
proceeding is unfair and unreliable. In the context of coerced confessions, for example, the Supreme Court has articulated concerns about
inappropriate state action, for example, torturing a suspect until he confessed, and the reliability of a coerced confession. 255 In the civil realm,
accuracy is an explicit factor under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test used to evaluate procedural due process claims by weighing three
factors: the private interest that will be affected by official action, the
risk of an erroneous result, and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. 256

251 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.12 (2010) (summarizing history of
incorporation of Bill of Rights on states); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 2.7(b) (3d ed. 2010) (observing that in some areas, “the Court's post-incorporation rulings
initially relied on due process and subsequently turned to a specific guarantee as an alternative
grounding for imposing basically the same constitutional limitations”).
252 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 251, § 2.7(a) (providing examples of due process–based criminal procedural protections).
253 Id. § 6.2(c) (describing due process analysis of confessions).
254 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (referring to the “inherently compelling
pressures” of “in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime”); see also
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (“In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance
on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary
custodial confession, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt.” (citation omitted)).
255 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484–85 nn.12–13 (1972) (observing that while
coercion is the touchstone of due process analysis of confessions, trustworthiness of the confession has been an abiding concern) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 385–86); see also 2
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 251, § 6.2(c) (describing prohibited tactics to obtain confessions). In
due process analysis of identifications, reliability is a primary concern. See United States v. Crew,
445 U.S. 463, 473 n.19 (1980) (“[T]he ‘independent source’ test of United States v. Wade and
Stovall v. Denno . . . seeks only to determine whether the in-court identification is sufficiently
reliable to satisfy due process . . . .” (citations omitted)).
256 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Markowitz, supra note 3, at
1352–55 (proposing how the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge might be adapted to create more
protective procedural protections in immigration proceedings).
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In immigration law, accuracy, fairness, and the risks attached to
prejudicial error are compelling concerns. The government processes a
huge number of cases every year, in a bureaucracy that is overwhelmed
and understaffed. The government’s high reversal rate on legal issues in
the appellate courts and at the Supreme Court indicates that the risk of
error is high. The risk of harm from those errors is extreme because a
deported aggravated felon cannot legally return to this country and may
face actual harm—even torture or death—as a result of an erroneous
legal decision to remove them. These concerns support the need for
additional procedural safeguards under Mathews. Indeed, in the immigration context, the Court has signaled a willingness to safeguard judicial review, check aggressively broad statutory interpretation, and create
broadly applicable procedural rules to avoid due process concerns.257
The six-month detention rule in Zadvydas is significant in that it applied
generally to a class of cases, namely, all post-removal detention proceedings. 258 The Court justified its six-month rule as necessary to provide the agency leeway in executing removal decisions, while still complying with constitutional due process norms. 259 Similar reasoning
could support judicially developed, standardized procedural rights in
immigration proceedings.
Unlike the Sixth Amendment pathway, rights developed under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause need not depend on categorization of immigration proceedings as “criminal.” The Court’s decision in
Padilla suggests that the civil–criminal labels are “ill-suited” to questions of permanent deportation based on criminal conviction. Getting
courts to recognize that immigration proceedings are sufficiently criminal to fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment may prove difficult.
Even if the Sixth Amendment were held to apply to immigration cases,
there would remain serious questions about how it would apply and
whether Sixth Amendment protections would sufficiently protect noncitizens in removal proceedings. Traditionally, when the Supreme Court
has incorporated a federal constitutional right to make it applicable to
states, the right has been applied co-extensively in federal and state proceedings. Because state and federal criminal prosecutions are essentially
parallel systems, adapting new constitutional standards is not a difficult
task, at least in theory. In contrast, immigration proceedings are distinct
and importing Sixth Amendment procedures might pose some challenges. For example, Sixth Amendment protections are offense specif-

257
258

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–87 (2001).
Id. at 699–701 (reasoning that the rule would “recognize some presumptively reasonable
period of detention” and “limit the occasions when courts will need” to rule on the legality of
detention in individualized cases”).
259 Id. at 700.
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ic 260 and only apply to felonies and misdemeanors involving a loss of
liberty. 261 Because these features of criminal law have no clear analogs
in immigration court, application of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in immigration cases would require new rules.
Pursuing the Fifth Amendment pathway dispenses with these questions and allows courts to innovate rights, borrowing from the Sixth
Amendment as needed, and retooling it to fit the immigration context
when necessary without fear of implication for the criminal context.
This flexibility also allows courts to craft rights that would be more
protective than their Sixth Amendment counterparts. Greater protection,
greater flexibility, and greater speed in adoption (because they build on
a framework already established by the Supreme Court) are three strong
reasons to pursue a Fifth Amendment based strategy towards establishing more protection of noncitizens in immigration court.
Two areas ripe for innovation in immigration proceedings are discovery and the right to counsel. Both are critically important to improving the fairness and accuracy of the agency proceedings and would facilitate more efficient and meaningful judicial review. The following
discussion examines constitutional discovery and the right to counsel as
they apply in criminal cases under the Sixth Amendment and shows
how comparable, or even more protective, rights could be applied in
immigration proceedings relying on the due process motivated framework described in Part II.
A.
1.

Discovery

Constitutional Discovery in Criminal Court

Consider the issue of discovery in the criminal and immigration
contexts. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to discovery
that entitles him to material exculpatory and impeachment evidence in
the possession of the prosecution or its agents even without a request.262

260 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001) (stating that “the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is ‘offense specific,’” meaning that it attaches only to those offenses for which the defendant has been formally charged, and not to “other offenses ‘closely related factually’ to the
charged offense”).
261 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to counsel to all misdemeanor state proceedings in which there is a potential loss of liberty).
262 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process requires prosecutors
to “avoi[d] . . . an unfair trial” by disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused that is material
either to guilt or to punishment); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995) (“[T]he
state’s obligation under Brady . . . turns on the cumulative effect of all . . . evidence suppressed
by the government . . . .”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 (1976) (holding that the
defense need not request exculpatory evidence under Brady); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
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This right to Brady evidence is a powerful tool for defendants, which in
aid of the truth seeking process of trial represents a departure from a
purely adversarial model. 263 While the right is grounded in due process,
it serves the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 264 The right is limited in
important respects, as the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to
share all useful information with the defendant. 265 Rather, the prosecutor only must disclose “material” evidence, which is favorable to the
accused and, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 266 To prove a constitutional discovery violation under Brady and its
progeny, the defendant must show that there is a “reasonable probability” that the prosecution’s disclosure of the suppressed evidence would
have led to a different result. 267
One significant critique of this rule is that it relies on the prosecutor as a gatekeeper to decide which favorable evidence to disclose. Under Brady and it progeny, the prosecutor decides what evidence is favorable to the defense and whether such evidence is “material.”268
While the Supreme Court has encouraged prosecutors to err on the side
of disclosure, 269 the prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable evidence is
adverse to his own litigation interests. 270 Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Bagley, argued that the prosecutor should be required to
disclose any favorable evidence, leaving it to defense counsel and the
trier of fact to ascertain its value. 271 But this is not the law, which pro150, 154 (1972) (holding that exculpatory evidence under Brady includes impeachment evidence).
263 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“By requiring the prosecutor to
assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure
adversary model.”).
264 See id. at 675 (“The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process.”); see also
United States v. Ruiz, 526 U.S. 622, 627 (2002) (citing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and discussing the right to a fair trial); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433–34 (referring to
due process and fair trial).
265 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977))
(“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”).
266 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (stating that exculpatory evidence is evidence the suppression of
which would “undermine confidence in the verdict”); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
267 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (“A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly
shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of
the trial.’”) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
268 Id. at 437 (stating that constitutional discovery accords “a degree of discretion” to the
prosecution, “which alone can know what is undisclosed” and requires it “to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
police”).
269 Id. at 440 (“The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not therefore be discouraged.”).
270 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[As the prosecutor] he must make the
often difficult decision as to whether evidence is favorable, and must decide on which side to err
when faced with doubt. In his role as advocate, the answers are clear. In his role as representative
of the state, the answers should be equally clear, and often to the contrary.”).
271 Id. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“After all, favorable evidence indisputably enhances
the truth-seeking process at trial. And it is the job of the defense, not the prosecution, to decide
whether and in what way to use arguably favorable evidence.”).
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vides for much narrower discovery and may result in the prosecutor’s
suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant. Indeed, media reports have highlighted instances in which Brady violations have contributed to wrongful prosecution and convictions. 272
Another significant limitation on constitutional disclosure is that it
may not apply when a defendant pleads guilty. The Court held in United
States v. Ruiz that the government is not constitutionally required to
disclose material impeachment evidence before the defendant pleads
guilty. 273 The Court reasoned in Ruiz that “impeachment information is
special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a
plea is voluntary.” 274 The Court could extend the same rule to the preplea disclosure of exculpatory evidence, though it has not addressed the
issue. 275 The Court has treated impeachment and exculpatory evidence
as equivalent for Brady purposes. 276 Since ninety-five percent of all
criminal convictions are obtained by guilty plea, the absence of constitutional discovery in some or all guilty plea cases impedes the flow of
favorable evidence to the accused or the trier of fact.
Applying a Brady-type constitutional discovery rule in immigration court would offer some advantages. The agency trial attorney
would be required to review government files and disclose any “material” exculpatory evidence. Since criminal guilt is not the issue, the “materiality” standard would need to be adapted to immigration law and, for
example, could cover any evidence that, alone or in conjunction with
other evidence, might reasonably affect the outcome of the removal
proceeding. Such a constitutionally mandated disclosure rule in removal
proceedings could be extremely helpful to noncitizens, who currently
rely on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, limited discovery,
and their own investigation to gather helpful information. 277 At the
same time, this constitutional discovery rule, if directly imported from
criminal law, is deeply flawed, thus limiting its utility in immigration
272 Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 847 (2010) (citing examples).
273 536 U.S. at 630 (the government is not constitutionally required to disclose material impeachment evidence before the defendant pleads guilty).
274 Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 954–55
(2008) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629).
275 Id. at 955.
276 Id.
277 See Regina Germain, Putting the “Form” in Immigration Reform, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
1145, 1146 (2007) (observing that the few discovery rules that exist relate to prehearing statements, subpoenas, and depositions, and “[t]here is no routine procedure for the government to
turn over any prior statements to immigration officials or for access to information contained in
previous filings with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service”); see also Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006));
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)); 8
C.F.R. §§ 103.8, 103.9, 103.10 (2011) (FOIA regulations); id. § 103.20–103.36 (Privacy Act
regulations).
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court. It would vest the disclosure decision in agency counsel and potentially deprive the immigration judge, the noncitizen facing removal,
and the appellate court’s review valuable evidence and information relevant to the legal issues and discretionary decisions affecting the outcome of the case.
2.

Discovery in Removal Proceedings

Now consider the facts in Dent v. Holder, in which the Ninth Circuit recognized that a person in removal proceedings is statutorily entitled to a copy of his or her alien file. 278 In Dent, the court established a
broad statutory disclosure rule relying on the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance to prevent serious due process violations. Consistent with the
blueprint outlined in Part II, the statutory disclosure rule in Dent is a
prophylactic rule, based on an existing immigration statute, designed to
avoid foreseeable, repeat due process concerns, for the protection and
benefit of a broad class of noncitizens in immigration proceedings. This
rule is broader than constitutional discovery afforded criminal defendants because it entitles the noncitizen to all documents within the government’s control, not merely those that the government deems important and helpful. And here, the aim of the disclosure rule is tailored to
immigration proceedings: to aid the immigration courts in developing
the record, especially for pro se litigants, and to facilitate judicial review
on appeal to the federal circuit courts of appeals.
a.

Dent Was Denied Access to His File
in Immigration Proceedings

Sazar Dent was charged in removal proceedings with being an
alien and having an aggravated felony conviction. He had previously
been convicted of narcotics possession and escape in the third degree in
Arizona and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. 279 The thirtyseven-year-old Honduran native had lived in the United States for over
two decades (since 1981) and the government alleged that he was a legal permanent resident, but not a citizen. 280 At a removal hearing, Dent
claimed that he was a naturalized U.S. citizen because an American
citizen had adopted him as a child. 281 The immigration judge, who knew
nothing about Dent’s adoption, continued the hearing so that Dent could
278
279
280
281

Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 375 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. He also argued that his escape conviction was not an aggravated felony. Id.
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provide his adoption papers. 282 After he did, the government objected
that Dent had failed to prove that his mother was a U.S. citizen. 283 Unable to locate his now-deceased mother’s birth certificate, Dent explained
in a letter to the immigration judge the circumstances of his adoption
and his inability to obtain his mother’s birth certificate or passport. The
government already had this information, he said, but was still requiring
him to prove it. 284 Unsatisfied, the immigration court rejected Dent’s
citizenship claim, found him an aggravated felon, and ordered him removed to Honduras. On appeal to the BIA, Dent asked for help in getting documents relevant to his citizenship claim, but he got no response. 285 Dent was deported to Honduras.
In his federal appeal, Dent claimed that his due process rights were
violated because the government possessed documents relating to his
citizenship claim that it failed to disclose in removal proceedings.
Dent’s federal appeal had been delayed several years due to agency
error. 286 In the interim, Dent had returned to the United States, and was
prosecuted for illegal reentry. 287 During the criminal prosecution, which
was eventually dismissed, Dent was represented by counsel and obtained documents from his Alien file, or “A-file,” that he had never seen
before. 288 These documents included a naturalization application Dent’s
adoptive mother had filed on Dent’s behalf in 1982 when Dent was
fourteen, and an Application to File Petition for Naturalization Dent had
filed on his own behalf in 1986, when he was eighteen. These documents, which appeared not to have been adjudicated, had always been in
the government’s control, but were never given to Dent in the removal
proceedings. 289 Dent claimed that the government’s failure to disclose
these documents in removal proceedings violated due process.

282
283
284

Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. (telling the immigration judge in his letter, “[s]o I know that the government really
knows that she was a U.S. born citizen”).
285 Id. at 372.
286 Id. at 370.
287 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006)).
288 See id. at 368 (“An A-file is the file maintained by various government agencies for each
alien on record. ‘Contents include, but are not limited to passport, driver’s license, other identification cards, and photographs; immigration history (prior record); and all documents and transactions’ relating to the alien.” (quoting U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., INS DETENTIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL (2000), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detentionstandards/pdf/defin.pdf)).
289 Id. at 370.
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The Court Construes a Disclosure Statute
to Require A-file Disclosure

Citing due process concerns and constitutional avoidance, the court
in Dent relied on a disclosure statute to establish a broad right of access
to relevant documents for every person on removal proceeding. Though
the court’s analysis hews to the problem at hand, namely, accessing
information from the government A-file, the court’s approach reflects
broader themes about judicial review and oversight and the need for
procedural standards to prevent foreseeable due process violations, and
facilitate adequate judicial review.
The key in Dent was the so-called “mandatory access law,” which
the court relied on to develop a broad due process–based discovery
rule. 290 By its terms, the statute requires aliens to prove lawful presence
in the United States “by clear and convicting evidence.” 291 In order to
meet this burden of proof in removal proceedings, “the alien shall have
access” to his entry document “and any other records and documents,
not considered by the Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to
the alien’s admission or presence in the United States.” 292 While this
broad language would appear to include the entire A-file and any other
relevant documents in the government’s control, the government argued
that disclosure was not required because Dent’s lawful presence was not
in dispute, 293 and he needed first to file a request under FOIA. 294
Voicing due process concerns, the court in Dent relied on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to interpret the “mandatory access law”
broadly. The “doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires us to construe the statute and the regulation, if possible, to avoid a serious constitutional question.” 295 The “mandatory access law,” the court said, pro290

Id. at 375 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2006)). § 1229a(c)(2) provides:
(2) Burden on alien
In the proceeding the alien has the burden of establishing—
....
(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the
United States pursuant to a prior admission.
In meeting the burden of proof under subparagraph (B), the alien shall have
access to the alien’s visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records
and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the alien’s admission or presence in the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Brief for Respondent at 40, Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. CA 0971987).
294 Dent, 627 F.3d at 374.
295 Id. (citing Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989)).
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vides a rule for removal proceedings, and it “would indeed be unconstitutional if the law entitled an alien in removal proceedings to his A-file,
but denied him access to it until it was too late to use it.” 296 The court
found that Dent’s due process rights had been violated because his Afile may show that he is in fact a naturalized citizen. The statutory right
of access established in Dent does not turn on a due process violation or
a claim of citizenship. The court required the government to hand over
the A-file in every removal proceeding: “[t]he only practical way to
give an alien access is to furnish him with a copy,” adding, “[w]e are
unable to imagine a good reason for not producing the A-file routinely
without a request.” 297
3.

Creating Protective Procedures in
Removal Proceedings

The access rule in Dent is premised on facilitating judicial review
and ensuring fundamental procedural fairness for persons in removal
proceedings. The court was especially concerned about ensuring fairness and developing the record in cases in which the alien is unrepresented and facing deportation. Congress created in § 1229a(c)(2)(B) a
broad right of access so that noncitizens could meet their burden of
proof in removal proceedings. 298 Requiring a noncitizen to use FOIA to
access his A-file during removal proceedings could create serious due
process concerns, and contribute to him losing or foregoing certain
claims and defenses as a result. 299 Such concerns are magnified given
the consequences facing the noncitizen, namely, certain and possibly
permanent deportation. The rule in Dent allows similar access as
FOIA, 300 but accomplishes disclosure within the removal process itself.
This rule not only speeds up disclosure, but also shifts the burden from
the alleged noncitizen having to make a request (under FOIA) to the
government having to disclose a physical copy of the file without a request (under the “mandatory access law”).
The disclosure rule also facilitates record development, informed
decision-making at the agency level, and judicial review of legal issues
in the federal courts. In Dent, the government’s failure to disclose
296 Id. (“That would unreasonably impute to Congress and the agency a Kafkaesque sense of
humor about aliens’ rights.”).
297 Id. at 375.
298 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2006).
299 Dent, 627 F.3d at 374 (“It would indeed be unconstitutional if the law entitled an alien in
removal proceedings to his A-file, but denied him access to it until it was too late to use it.”).
300 While FOIA limits access based on statutory exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b),
§ 1229(a)(2) permits access to documents “not considered by the Attorney General to be confidential.”
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Dent’s A-file meant that the immigration judge was unaware of facts
relevant to Dent’s citizenship claim, which impeded his “duty to fully
develop the record.” 301 Pro se aliens, the court added,
often lack the legal knowledge to navigate their way successfully
through the morass of immigration law, and because their failure to
do so successfully might result in their expulsion from this country,
it is critical that the [immigration judge] “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant
facts.” 302

The value of judicial review is heightened when, as in Dent, the
immigration judge is tasked with deciding legal issues not within its
primary area of expertise, namely, citizenship (as a defense to removal
proceedings) and an aggravated felony determination applying federal
criminal law to a state-court conviction. The federal appellate court
determines citizenship claims asserted in removal proceedings 303 and
reviews aggravated felony determinations de novo. Because reviewable
legal issues are often part of the removal process, courts have an institutional interest in ensuring that the record before them was fairly developed. The rule in Dent serves that purpose.
Importantly, the rule in Dent is broader than constitutional discovery in criminal cases. Under Dent, the government must hand over the
entire file (except privileged documents). Unlike in criminal constitutional discovery, the government attorney is not tasked with identifying
which evidence in the file in is favorable and whether it is “material.”
The Dent rule applies in every case; under current law, criminal constitutional discovery is not clearly required in guilty plea cases—which are
most cases. Importing criminal constitutional discovery into the immigration context would create the risk that the procedure will be insufficient to actually protect noncitizens in removal proceedings, facilitate
informed decision making, and facilitate meaningful judicial review.
Some might argue that a Brady-type disclosure in immigration
proceedings would be better than no disclosure requirement at all (other
than FOIA), as remains the rule in most jurisdictions. Dent offers a different model: one that is more protective, statute-based and grounded in
due process, tailored to the immigration proceedings, and which maximizes the flow of information to those who need it, namely, noncitizens
and the courts. Criminal defendants should prefer such a rule to Brady.

301
302
303

Dent, 627 F.3d at 374 (citing Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (vesting courts with power to decide nationality claims asserted in
removal proceedings); id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (authorizing judicial review of legal issues, including
aggravated felony determinations).
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Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases is the
crown jewel of criminal procedural protections and, for good reason, is
the right most coveted by noncitizens in immigration court. When the
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
applying it to the states, it recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.” 304 Because immigration proceedings have
long been categorized as “civil,” the Sixth Amendment does not apply
to them. No similar categorical right to counsel exists under the Due
Process Clause. Instead, the Court has recognized that counsel may be
constitutionally required in some civil cases to ensure fundamental fairness in light of the private interest at stake and the risk of error. 305 No
general due process right to counsel in removal proceedings has been
recognized and Congress prohibits the appointment of counsel at government expense. 306 Scholars have charted two main pathways for establishing a right to counsel in removal proceedings. One is to categorize removal proceedings as “criminal” or “quasi-criminal” so that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies.307 The other is to justify the
appointment of counsel under the civil law test, 308 or some blending of
the two approaches. Practical interventions such as increasing pro bono

304 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states). Courts have recognized that lawyers are necessities in immigration
court as well, due to complexity of the law. See, e.g., Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 2005) (“The proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a
labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate.”).
305 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (holding that appointment of counsel is necessary
for the transfer of prisoners to mental health facilities); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) (recognizing a due process right to counsel in civil cases); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47
(1967) (appointing counsel in delinquency proceedings); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 21 (1981) (holding that appointment of counsel may be required in termination of parental rights cases).
306 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented,
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice
in such proceedings.”).
307 See Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1314–25 (exploring criminal-civil distinction); Markowitz,
supra note 8, at 348–50.
308 See Kanstroom, supra note 1, at 1504 (proposing a right to deportation counsel rooted in
the “deep relationship between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Markowitz, supra note 3, at
1355–60 (articulating three step analysis adapted from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), which would support a right to counsel in removal proceedings based on criminal conviction). Scholars have argued for a right to counsel in other immigration proceedings based on the
noncitizen’s circumstances, see e.g., Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process
Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373,
400–12 (2011), or specific defenses, like asylum, e.g., Elizabeth Glazer, The Right to Appointed
Counsel in Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1157 (1985); John R. Mills et al., “Death Is
Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361, 363 (2009).
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assistance to persons in immigration proceedings might provide another
solution, at least for some. 309
Under the framework developed in Part II, the right to appointed
counsel should apply categorically to removal proceedings in which the
noncitizen is charged with having a prior aggravated felony. The purpose here is not to resolve the debate over the proper or exclusive pathway to achieving the right to counsel. Rather, it is to examine this issue
using this framework to incorporate unique aspects of doctrine and judicial oversight in the immigration-removal context.
1.

A Right to Counsel in Aggravated
Felony Cases

Strong reasons support a right to appointed counsel in removal
proceedings involving an aggravated felony charge. The judicial-review
framework described in Part II identifies several core themes in the Supreme Court’s immigration cases that support this right to counsel in
this category of cases premised on robust judicial review of statutory
and constitutional legal issues, the criminal content of aggravated felony
determinations, and the need for procedures that prevent foreseeable,
repeat due process concerns while minimizing judicial interference.
Although federal courts have recognized that due process may require
the appointment of counsel in individual cases to ensure the fundamental fairness, such appointments are not common. 310 Rather than address
this issue case-by-case, courts should guarantee the statutory right to
counsel afforded by Congress by requiring the appointment of counsel
categorically in aggravated felony cases based on the high stakes and
criminal law issues involved. 311
Key features of removal proceedings involving aggravated felonies
highlight due process concerns of liberty and fairness. These include the
risk of permanent harm from an erroneous legal determination, the
complexity of that legal determination in many cases, and the burdens
on access to counsel during removal proceedings. Removal proceed309 See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008).
310 See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 586 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The test for whether
due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in any given
case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process.”); see also Escobar-Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting that some immigration proceedings may require the appointment of counsel to comport
with Fifth Amendment due process requirements).
311 “The right to counsel in immigration proceedings is rooted in the Due Process Clause and
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1362 and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).” Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094,
1100 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that noncitizens were denied statutory right to counsel in removal
proceedings).
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ings, though historically regarded as civil, operate as an extension of the
criminal proceeding that led to conviction. Padilla makes clear that
immigration consequences are central to the criminal process. 312 Lopez
and Carachuri-Rosendo suggest that interests at stake in an underlying
guilty plea would be disturbed if the immigration court on its own could
enhance the immigration consequences that flow from criminal conduct,
regardless of the actual conviction. 313 These cases highlight the government’s penchant for broadly interpreting criminal statutes in the immigration context, despite statutory canons requiring leniency. It seems
unfair that noncitizens have the benefit of counsel in the underlying
criminal case, but do not have counsel in the subsequent removal proceeding when the terms and significance of that guilty plea are probed
and tested in a technical and complex legal analysis. 314
Mandatory detention of aggravated felons burdens the statutory
right to retained counsel of choice and risks compromising the fairness
and accuracy of the proceedings. 315 Detention, i.e., bodily liberty, is a
significant concern in any due process analysis, 316 and it is mandatory
for noncitizens charged with removal based on a prior aggravated felony. 317 Further impeding the right to counsel, the government frequently
either initiates or transfers proceedings to a forum far from the noncitizen’s residence. 318 Some scholars have argued that such transfers implicate venue-based due process concerns. 319 Transfer and detention significantly burden the noncitizen’s statutory right to retain counsel of

312
313

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2586–88 (2010) (holding actual conviction
must supply basis for immigration consequences); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
(rejecting notion that aggravated felony determination could rest on state classification for conduct not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws).
314 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (plea agreements are enforceable
contracts).
315 See Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1098 (“The high stakes of a removal proceeding and the maze of
immigration rules and regulations make evident the necessity of the right to counsel. The proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer
could navigate.”) (citing Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988)).
316 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”).
317 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006) (requiring mandatory custody pending removal). Such detention
is lawful in part because it is temporary and administrative. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 527 (2003) (rejecting due process challenge mandatory detention of criminal aliens during
removal proceedings).
318 NYIRS Report, supra note 72, at 363 (stating that sixty-four percent of noncitizens detained in New York are transferred to far-off detention centers, most frequently in Texas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania).
319 See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee
Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17 (2011).
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choice 320 or access to free legal services. In some remote areas, legal
services are simply unavailable. It may be impracticable or infeasible
for retained counsel to represent a client who has been moved to another
part of the country. Though the quality of retained counsel in immigration proceedings is a perennial concern, 321 recent figures suggest having
counsel dramatically increases a noncitizen’s chance of success in immigration proceedings. 322 Detention is critical to due process because it
may burden the noncitizen’s ability to retain counsel or legal assistance,
his ability to effectively self-represent, and his will to challenge the
immigration court decision administratively and judicially.
In making aggravated felony determinations, immigration courts
adjudicate criminal law issues outside their native institutional area of
expertise. Courts have long deferred to the Executive Branch on sensitive matters within involving immigration expertise, including whom to
admit, exclude, or remove from this country. In cases seeking removal
based on a prior aggravated felony determination, the issues are purely
legal and do not touch on these sensitive areas of agency expertise. Rather, the immigration court to must analyze state or federal criminal law,
as interpreted by state and federal courts, and criminal records. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected on statutory interpretation
grounds the government’s expansive reading of federal and state criminal statutes at issue in these cases. 323 The legal analysis required in these
cases can be very complex and has developed circuit-by-circuit. 324 Given the high stakes and the government’s track record on broadly interpreting criminal laws in this context, noncitizens would be more protected if counsel were developing legal arguments on their behalf in the
immigration court.
Zadvydas provides a template for prophylactic procedures applied
categorically to certain groups particularly at risk for due process violations. 325 In Zavydas, the Supreme Court read into the post-removal sta320 In criminal cases, denial of the right to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment and is structural error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 212 (2006).
321 See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) (describing elements of due processbased claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (B.I.A.
2009) (ordering rulemaking on Lozada framework on ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
removal proceedings).
322 See supra note 72.
323 See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (holding that misdemeanor
simple drug possession conviction under Texas law that could have, but was not actually charged
as a recidivist offense, was not a felony under federal drug law); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47
(2006) (holding that South Dakota felony offense of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine
was not punishable as a felony under federal drug laws); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10–12
(2004) (holding that absent proof of reckless or intentional mental state, Florida DUI causing
serious injury was not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and was thus not an “aggravated felony”).
324 See García Hernández, supra note 319, at 36.
325 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001).
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tute a reasonable detention duration of six months in order to prevent—
not merely to redress—unlawful (indefinite) detention. A primary reason for this was to give the government leeway in effectuating removal
with minimal judicial oversight. The same rationale can justify the appointment of counsel in all removal proceedings involving aggravated
felony charges. These persons are detained. If determined to have committed an aggravated felony, they will be permanently exiled, and ineligible for discretionary relief. Upon return they face enhanced criminal penalties. In these cases, the aggravated felony determination is a
critical threshold issue: only if the noncitizen is not an aggravated felon
does the immigration court advance to its actual area of expertise,
namely, determining what discretionary relief is available and whether
to grant it. 326 While judicial review of aggravated felony determinations
remains an important feature, the process would be much more streamlined if criminal legal issues were fully vetted by counsel in immigration court.
Finally, providing counsel in aggravated felony cases might significantly affect the government’s charging decisions. If aggravated felony
cases required the appointment of counsel and other cases did not, the
government might forego charging an aggravated felony and instead
litigate whether the noncitizen is entitled to any form of discretionary
relief. Requiring counsel for the most serious criminals is a judicial response that might restore some civil discretionary balance to immigration law, preserve the aggravated felony charging option, and enhance
the fairness and accuracy of those proceedings at the agency level and
on judicial review.
2.

An Incremental Approach

The strength of the due process–based approach is that it is incremental and does not depend on the nettlesome civil–criminal classification. The Supreme Court in Padilla recognized that criminal proceedings and their immigration consequences are “enmeshed,” and that for
noncitizens immigration consequences may drive resolution of the criminal case.327 While the Court characterized immigration proceedings as
civil, it acknowledged deportation as a uniquely severe and increasingly
automatic penalty resulting from criminal conviction by noncitizens.
For the Court in Padilla, the question of whether deportation is a civil
or criminal consequence was not dispositive to its holding requiring
appointed counsel to advise criminal clients on the risk of deportation
326 Markowitz, supra note 3, at 1359 (referring to “extraordinarily complicated legal issues” at
play in determining whether a noncitizen is removal based on a prior conviction).
327 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct 1473, 1481 (2010).
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resulting from plea. Padilla seeds the notion that the Court may in time
conclude that removal proceedings based on criminal conviction are
sufficiently criminal to warrant the application of Sixth Amendment
protections. That does not appear imminent and, arguably, may not provide the best protection for immigrants.
An important aspect of the judicial due process–framework is that
immigration courts are limited by statute and institutionally in what they
do and this fact justifies judicial oversight. According full Sixth
Amendment rights in removal proceedings and endowing immigration
courts with the power to guarantee such rights might radically change
what it is that immigration courts do and how its decisions are reviewed.
By statute, immigration courts must consider state and federal criminal
laws in determining prior aggravated felony convictions. By case law,
immigration courts are limited in their analysis of a prior conviction to
the record of conviction and cannot enhance the conviction based on
their own factfinding or by adding procedural safeguards. By legislative
design and tradition, the immigration courts possess institutional expertise on sensitive areas of immigration, including whom to charge or
grant discretionary relief. This discretion bears on whether and on what
grounds to initiate removal proceedings. Once a person is charged as
being removable based on an aggravated felony, that determination is
purely a question of law, reviewable by the courts, and, because it centers on criminal convictions and law, does not actually involve agency
expertise.
Applying the Sixth Amendment wholesale in removal proceedings
might lay a foundation for expanding the functions immigration courts
perform and change the nature of judicial oversight. Some have argued
that immigration consequences should be settled in criminal court in a
streamlined process that would allow the full vetting of criminal consequences with the assistance of appointed counsel. 328 If immigration
courts could guarantee criminal procedural protections, why not allow
them to adjudicate underlying criminal conduct and then impose immigration consequences immediately in a single streamlined process? Rather than simply make immigration proceedings more fair, this result
might create a “crimmigration” process that bypasses traditional criminal court altogether. While such a result seems unlikely to occur, the
point is simply that immigration courts are, well, immigration courts—
courts of limited jurisdiction based on particularized expertise. Their
authoritative reach should remain limited to what they are competent to
do. To the extent that their determinations touch upon criminal judicial

328 Taylor & Wright, supra note 123, at 1175–84 (suggesting efficiencies and advantages of
streamlining procedure so that criminal sentencing judge would adjudicate immigration consequences of conviction).
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proceedings or matters, such concerns may be adequately addressed
through targeted due process protections overseen by courts of law.
The due process approach is incremental and flexible. This approach is not inconsistent with the argument that removal proceedings
in immigration court are criminal in nature. But the due process approach draws on more than the fact that noncitizens are detained and
facing severe consequences, with criminal law analysis forming the
focus of the immigration court’s inquiry. Rather, this framework, anchored in due process and traditional judicial oversight, posits a broader
stage of institutional actors—immigration officials, local, state, and
federal prosecutors, and reviewing federal courts interpreting statutes
consistent with constitutional norms. This approach places courts at the
center, balancing and respecting institutional actors and ensuring basic
due process.
CONCLUSION
For noncitizens facing removal for having an aggravated felony
conviction, the stakes are especially high. Their future turns on a legal
assessment of their criminal history by an immigration court that has no
institutional expertise in criminal adjudication or the state or criminal
law that forms the focus of the inquiry. While courts have long deferred
to immigration courts on sensitive matters within their expertise, such
deference does not extend to the immigration court decisions on matters
of criminal law central to the aggravated felony determination. Rather,
the robust judicial oversight of such decisions has highlighted the role
courts play in ensuring that immigration decisions are not at odds with
federal criminal law, state sovereign interests in criminal prosecution,
and the procedural protections and negotiated expectations encapsulated
in criminal guilty pleas. Though additional procedural protections in
immigration courts are required to better protect noncitizens in removal
proceedings, it is not clear those protections should be derived from
Sixth Amendment criminal law. The Due Process Clause better reflects
the institutional concerns at play and may afford better protection.

